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This dissertation examines the existence of heterogeneous motives in markets,
particularly how a tension between profit motives and other utility can shape out-
comes for organizations and individuals. I explore this tension in the context of
biases, organizational identity, and investment behavior. Each of the three em-
pirical chapters employs decision-level data from a different online crowdfunding
platform.
Academic researchers and the general public are increasingly interested in the
phenomenon of “crowdfunding.” The term, however, encompasses an incredibly
diverse set of activities—ranging from the facilitation of for-profit start-up invest-
ments to the charitable funding of medical procedures. This diversity can make it
difficult to generalize research insights from studies of any particular instance of the
phenomenon. In the introductory chapter I develop a general framework for un-
derstanding the source of observed behavior on crowdfunding platforms given some
simple assumptions about platform policies. The goal is to provide context for the
subsequent chapters of the dissertation.
The first empirical chapter examines biases against demographic groups, which
are typically explained by one of two mechanisms: either decision makers have
a taste for one demographic group over another, or demographics are employed
as informational proxies for other unobserved but economically important traits.
These mechanisms are difficult to empirically untangle despite the theoretical and
practical importance of separating them. I attempt to do so in a Chinese peer-to-
peer lending market by leveraging a loan guarantee policy that reduces the economic
rationale for lenders to discriminate on borrower demographics such as gender and
geography. Comparison of pre- and post-policy periods therefore provides a fruitful
tool for measuring the degree of taste versus informational bias. I find that female
borrowers appear to receive a preferential informational bias but a negative taste
bias, while lenders’ geographic bias toward borrowers located in the same province
appears to be driven predominately by informational processes and not taste. These
findings have implications for multiple sets of decision makers and underscore the
theoretical importance of accounting for motives.
Chapter two examines the potentially conflicting investment motives found
on a non-profit hybrid identity crowdfunding platform, where simultaneous market-
like and charity-like motives may lead lenders to respond differently to funding
requests from entrepreneurs who appear to have high economic ability and high
personal need. I survey actual lenders on the platform to measure their stated
preferences for borrowers who fit each of these categories. I find that 1) lenders vary
in their preference for these categories and this preference is correlated with their
demographics, and 2) past loans made by lenders with an above-average preference
for both need and ability were funded faster than loans in other categories. These
results highlight how actors’ preferences are largely endogenous to the market in
which they are observed.
In the final chapter I present the results of a simple online experiment con-
ducted in conjunction with a peer-to-peer lending website. Potential lenders were
presented randomized versions of the platform’s lender registration web page. The
content of the page varied in whether it promoted the potential social benefit of lend-
ing versus only the financial benefit. No difference was found between the treatment
and control groups. The experiment provides some insight into how lenders self-
select into crowdfunding activity and may serve as a model for similar experiments
on other platforms.
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Chapter 0: Introduction: A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing
Behavior on Crowdfunding Platforms
0.1 Introduction
There is growing interest in the phenomenon of crowdfunding from both the
general public and academics. Figure 0.1 plots one measure of public popularity,
the volume of worldwide Google searches for the term “crowdfunding” (Agrawal
et al., 2013). Growth in popularity has been sustained since 2010. Along with
this has come considerable academic interest. Recent conferences and conference
sessions have focused exclusively on the topic (e.g., the Academy of Management’s
2014 Annual Meeting1, the Strategic Management Society’s 2014 Annual Interna-
tional Conference2, and multiple Berkeley symposia3). Despite crowdfunding having
emerged as a popular social science and entrepreneurship research context, the di-
versity of crowdfunding platforms makes it difficult to generalize findings across
1For example, session 1106 “The Crowdfunding Phenomenon: Mapping Research and Data
Opportunities” http://program.aomonline.org/2014/submission.asp?mode=showsession&
SessionID=150 and session 1462 “Crowdfunding State of the Union and the Related Re-
search Horizon” http://program.aomonline.org/2014/submission.asp?mode=showsession&
SessionID=1097
2SMS 2014 Conference Extension on “Crowdfunding and Entrepreneurship” in San Sebastian,
Spain: http://madrid.strategicmanagement.net/extensions/san-sebastian.php
3UC Berkeley Fung Institute Academic Symposium on Crowdfunding, 2013, 2014: http://
www.funginstitute.berkeley.edu/event/academic-symposium-crowdfunding
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seemingly related crowdfunding studies.
The primary focus of most crowdfunding research is to understand why spe-
cific individuals, projects, or businesses achieve greater success in fundraising than
others. The explanations may come from the behavior of the crowd (e.g., herding,
social networks), the characteristics of the recipients themselves (e.g., attributes, re-
sources), or some combination of the two (e.g., discrimination). Most of these studies
employ a single context, so generalizing this research can be a challenge given the
diversity of settings. “The Crowdfunding Canvas” presented by Gary Dushnitsky
at the 2014 Academy of Management Annual Meeting highlights the range of plat-
forms used for crowdfunding research.4 Kickstarter appears to be the most frequent
research context. However, it represents just a single platform of one specific type
of crowdfunding model. How can researchers think about the generalizability of
research conducted in such settings?
It may help to first isolate what makes crowdfunding unique, as the behaviors
that crowdfunding facilitates are all found elsewhere to varying degrees. For ex-
ample, banks make loans; charities support the arts; angel investors fund startups.
It is the development of new mediating technology that now allows individuals to
connect in what is typically termed “crowdfunding.” Therefore, the specifics of a
given crowdfunding platform have significant opportunities to define the dynamics
of this new phenomenon.
A handful of existing studies analyze crowdfunding at this higher level as op-
posed to examining a specific platform. A working paper by Agrawal et al. (2013)
4http://www.dushnitsky.com/uploads/2/7/8/3/2783896/cf__canvas.pdf
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outlines the “economics of crowdfunding,” including the incentives and disincen-
tives of the various participants understood through economic theory. It is more
comprehensive than what I present below. Belleflamme et al. (2014) focus on the
role of the platform directly by developing a model of two types of entrepreneurial
crowdfunding activity—consumption through pre-order and profit-sharing through
investments—and detail how “community benefit” provided by the activity can make
those models more efficient than other fundraising channels.
This essay develops a general framework for thinking about how the structure
of a platform influences the behavior of funders and the success or failure of specific
projects. The goal is to broadly explain the success and failure of a project on
a generic crowdfunding platform. To do so, I will attempt to explicate how the
policies of the platform interact with the motives of the resource providers and the
characteristics of the recipients to shape dynamics. How does a platform attract
funders with the specific set of preferences that are ultimately observed? What
mechanisms might allow for heterogeneity in funder preferences on a single platform?
This can provide a framework for better interpreting research results produced from
any one particular crowdfunding setting.
0.2 The framework
I begin by mapping the role of the three main actors in any crowdfunding
context: the capital providers (funders), the capital recipients, and the platforms
that facilitate the matching of funders and recipients. The focus of the framework
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is on how platform-level characteristics influence outcomes. The incentives in this
framework are simpler than those outlined in Agrawal et al. (2013), because the
focus is primarily on the platforms’ policies. Also, I do not address the informa-
tion asymmetry issues that become clear when the funds are primarily used for
entrepreneurial activity.
In its most abstract form, crowdfunding involves the solicitation of funds from
resource providers by resource seekers through an intermediate platform. This pro-
cess unfolds as follows. A crowdfunding platform either solicits or screens appli-
cations from a self-selected pool of resource seekers at time t − 1. At time t a
separate self-selected group of resource providers makes decisions to invest in a re-
source seeker. Once resource seekers have received funds, they use the money for
the desired activity at time t+1. The platform then typically facilities the transfer
of either resources (money, products) or information from the recipients back to the
funders at time t+ 2.
At each of these stages there is significant opportunity for a platform to in-
fluence the behavioral equilibria that will ultimately be observed by a researcher.
Therefore, understanding the hard and soft policies that the platforms implement
is crucial to understanding the behavior that takes place on a platform. Figure
0.2 sketches the general relationship between these actors. Each instance of the
relationships depicted in Figure 0.2, however, is the result of an earlier process of
self-selection between funders and platforms and to a lesser extent recipients and
platforms. This ecosystem is illustrated in Figure 0.3. In the following sections I
further develop the assumptions related to each set of actors.
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0.2.1 Funders
Funders are the actors that provide the money. Depending on the context,
they may be similar to traditional lenders, investors, donors, or customers. Some
simple assumptions about their behavior are helpful to understand their role.
First, funders must have a motive for providing money. In this framework the
motives of funders vary in the degree of internal versus external focus. Internally
focused motives maximize the material returns to the funder. Internal motives
can be further divided between consumption—which may include activities such
as future delivery of products or even immediate entertainment—and investment—
which takes the form of expected future financial gain. On the other hand, externally
focused motives maximize the perceived benefit to the recipient—for example, an
outright donation.
This is a useful distinction for crowdfunding analyses because it highlights
what is often considered unique about the crowdfunding process. Traditional banks
or charity organizations are typically thought of as maximizing exclusively on one
of these dimensions. Concepts such as fiduciary responsibility and legal non-profit
status enforce this approach. The “crowd,” however, is often conceived of as having
fewer restrictions when it comes to making funding decisions. An individual can
freely mix and alternate between these motives even within a single funding decision.
For example, lending to a local business might provide both internal and external
utility.
Therefore, each capital provider i has a utility function that determines his or
5
her desired ratio between seeking internal and external returns. The external utility
is a function of recipient traits, and each funder has a preference for a specific set
of recipient traits which maximize this social utility. Finally, funders incur a search
cost in locating a specific recipient j on a specific platform k. It is assumed that
this cost consists of two components: the cost of finding the platform and the cost
of finding the project given the platform.
0.2.2 Fund seekers
Fund seekers are the potential recipients that pursue money through crowd-
funding platforms. I assume the need for funds is exogenous; that is, the existence
of the need is independent of the crowdfunding process itself. The main decision of
a potential recipient then becomes which platform to choose.
This decision is based on a number of characteristics of the potential recipient.
Each potential recipient j has a set of characteristics that include, 1) funding-use
attributes related to how the funding will be employed (e.g., personal consumption,
production, industry, time frame), and 2) personal attributes such as demographics
(e.g., location, background, gender).
Given these characteristics, a fund seeker chooses a specific platform k to
maximize his or her chance of receiving funding. This probability is determined
by the perceived “fit” with a platform (the characteristics of the potential recipient
interacted with a platform’s policies), which will be elaborated later, and also the
number of other funders and recipients using the platform.
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0.2.3 Platforms
All crowdfunding platforms provide a similar set of basic services. Most visibly,
they provide the technical infrastructure to host projects, accept payment from
funders, and transfer that money to recipients.5 Most also provide some form of
screening of potential recipients to conduct quality control. Platforms are classic
market makers with strong network effects. The more funders and recipients a
platform can attract, the greater the value of the platform to any single participant.
Therefore, the platform is also involved in the promotion of the platform to attract
new funders and recipients. Finally, platforms must make money to sustain their
function. Most do this through transaction fees.
I propose two main attributes that shape what might be considered the pri-
mary purpose and use of a given platform: its structure and its identity. It is the
specific policies of the platform along these dimensions that define how it can be
used and how it is actually used in practice. These elements are strategically de-
termined by the platform managers through various hard and soft policies, which
subsequently determine the behavior of actors on the platform.
Structure: Platforms are often grouped into four broad categories based on
the type of structural relationship they facilitate between funders and recipients:
debt, equity, rewards, and donation. “Debt” facilitates the lending of money to
borrowers, often with interest. “Equity” involves purchasing partial ownership in a
venture. “Rewards” involves purchasing a yet-to-be-produced good or service, often
5However, white label software solutions make it increasingly easy for anyone to run a crowd-
funding website. So the purely technical value of a platform is arguably approaching zero.
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without guarantee of delivery. “Donation” simply involves the transfer of money
and does not involve any future material commitment from the recipient. These are
somewhat loose categories and do not have fixed boundaries other than some legal
constraints (mostly related to debt and equity, see e.g., Government Accountability
Office, 2011). However, they can entail specific technical relationships between fun-
der and recipient. For example, all platforms are assumed to have a mechanism to
transfer money from funders to recipients (without which funding would not be pos-
sible). However, lending platforms must also have the ability to transfer money from
recipients back to funders. Lending platforms may also have ancillary systems such
as a collection mechanism to facilitate this repayment. A reward-based platform
may have a system for contacting funders so products can be delivered, whereas
other platforms might actively prevent interaction between funders and recipients
outside of the platform.
This structure is also reflected in the platform’s relationships with potential
funders and recipients. For example, a lending website might check credit scores
of potential recipients and verify other background information as part of due pro-
cess, while a medical donation platform might completely source its recipients from
trusted partners instead of allowing open application.
Identity: A softer version of this structure is found in a platform’s identity,
which allows a platform to specialize within the constraints of its structure. For
example, a platform whose mission is to facilitate loans for business versus one that
facilitates loans for education may be structurally similar but have different goals
that are realized through additional mechanisms. This identity will be represented
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in the advertising, mission statement, and other “soft” elements of the platform.
Screening of potential recipients will also be calibrated to match this identity.
Any given platform must choose how to set its structure and identity. It is
assumed a platform’s structure can take a number of discrete forms. For example,
the four broad types of crowdfunding mentioned above represent one possible set
of options: debt, equity, reward, or donation. These structures may be more or
less fluid, but a platform initially sets its structure based on perceived market need
when it is launched.
The platform then sets its identity, which for the sake of simplicity I assume
varies on whether it emphasizes external, internal, or mixed returns for funders.
Each identity represents the proposed benefit of the platform to potential funders.
These identities can be adjusted without changing the fundamental structure of the
platform. A platform also sets its identity based on perceived market need. For
example, two lending platforms may have the same structure but different identi-
ties (e.g., one facilitates loans to businesses—an internal benefit—while the other
facilitates low-interest loans to students at an alma mater—a mixed benefit).
It is assumed there is no gate keeping for potential funders—anyone who wants
to provide money is able to do so.6 The platform’s identity is therefore enacted by
the type of recipients actually available on the platform. Two gate-keeping pol-
icy variables, which are part of the recipient screening process, determine which
potential recipients are allowed onto the platform.
6In practice this assumption should be amended with a “within legal limits” stipulation. Par-
ticularly for activity related to debt and equity, there may be securities laws related to who can
become a potential funder.
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The first is recipient fit, which varies based on how closely an applicant must
match the predominant platform identity. The lower this value, the higher the
diversity of projects posted on the platform. The second is a quality threshold,
which further filters out potential recipients after they have met the fit requirements.
This may range from a simple rule—for example, meeting a minimum credit score
requirement in a borrowing context—to a more holistic evaluation of the potential
recipient’s quality.
Finally, in any given period t each platform k has a set of time variant at-
tributes. These include the number of projects and the diversity of recipient types
on the platform at time t.
0.2.4 Interaction between funders, platforms, and fund seekers
This simple framework can be used to analyze how dynamics might be ex-
pected to vary across platforms. For example, so-called “reward-based” crowdfund-
ing platforms such as Kickstarter can be used for both purely internal and purely
external motives, such as pre-selling or donating, respectively. Equity crowdfunding
has certain legal boundaries attached to it, though can still allow for the expression
of external rewards through, for example, the support of a local social enterprise.
The main unit of analysis is the decision of funders, as this ultimately defines
performance of potential recipients. Each decisioni,j,k is made by a funder i to a
recipient j on a specific platform k. This decision is shaped ex-ante by the mecha-
nisms discussed above. It is assumed that the platform is chosen first and then the
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recipient.7
In general, a platform seeks to appease existing funders on the platform by
offering them projects that fit their aggregate preferences. A funder j then chooses
between platforms in an attempt to maximize his or her expected utility. For exam-
ple, if he or she is driven primarily by internal concerns then he or she will choose
a platform with that identity. All else equal, lenders prefer a platform with more
recipients, as it increases the likelihood of locating a recipient that maximizes utility.
The funder also incurs a number of search costs. First, the greater the number
of platforms the higher the overall search cost. When evaluating a given platform,
the lower the quality variance on the platform the lower the search cost. The more
diverse the recipient characteristics are on a given platform, the higher the search
cost of finding a suitable recipient on that platform.
0.2.5 Insights from the framework
If it is assumed that a platform receives its operating expenses from each trans-
action between funders and recipients, then a platform’s overall goal is transaction
growth. What is the optimal strategy to increase growth given that a platform
is defined by its structure, identity, and gate keeping attributes of fit and quality?
There is also a strong path dependency from its state at t to t+ 1.
Funders on a platform with an internal identity expect something in return for
their money, which is costly for recipients. This means a platform with an external
7If the recipient is prominent enough to raise money on his or her own, it may be possible to
bypass the need to use a platform to raise funds.
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or mixed identity, all else equal, will draw more potential recipients because it allows
them to potentially obtain cheaper capital. At the extreme, a pure external identity
results in free donated capital for potential recipients. Therefore, I assume that all
recipients prefer an external or mixed platform to an internal one.
While a pure donation may be the optimal scenario for potential recipients, it
is unlikely that the characteristics of most recipients can generate enough external
utility for funders to make pure donation a utility maximizing choice. Therefore, if
a platform admits all of these potential recipients it will increase search costs for
funders, which decreases the overall expected utility of the platform. This means
that platforms with an external or mixed identity must restrict applicants to a
greater degree than internal platforms. This will result in the need for a higher
quality threshold at such platforms. Platforms will adjust their screening fit to
ensure the recipients do not deviate too far from the platform identity. Otherwise,
low quality recipients will increase the search costs for potential funders who, despite
deriving value from more potential recipients, will face lower expected utility from
using the platform. At the same time, there must be a sufficient number of funders
with utility functions to support a particular identity.
This analysis also highlights that there is an incentive for platforms to find ways
to increase the external utility they provide to funders. Increasing external utility
will increase the number of applicants. This may be accomplished by attempting to
shift the identity, perhaps through advertising. However, not all recipients will be
able to generate enough external benefit for funders and these will resort to using
platforms that promote internal benefit for funders.
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Because of network effects, dominant platforms might be expected to eventu-
ally develop within each type of structure. The large number of recipients on these
dominant platforms will increase the expected utility of funders during the first
stage of selection. Within a platform of a given structure it is optimal to encom-
pass as many different types of recipients as possible until marginal returns begin
to diminish from the search costs incurred by funders.
Given these insights, the dynamics of the crowdfunding industry are likely sim-
ilar to other settings. For example, the positional competition between crowdfund-
ing platforms is in some ways similar to the role of standard-setting organizations
(Lerner and Tirole, 2006; Chiao et al., 2007), in that each type of organization must
strategically set policies to attract applicants while not diluting the overall value of
the platform.
0.3 Application to existing crowdfunding research
Existing crowdfunding research is varied across a range of specific settings
including but not limited to reward-based platforms (Greenberg and Mollick, 2014;
Mollick, 2014; Marom et al., 2014; Burtch et al., 2015), for-profit lending (Duarte et
al., 2012; Leung and Sharkey, 2013; Chen et al., 2014; Freedman and Jin, 2014), and
non-profit lending (Burtch et al., 2014; Galak et al., 2011). The differences in these
platforms’ structure and identity are substantial. The interpretation of findings
can vary based on assumptions about a platform’s identity.
For example, if it appears that funders on a lending platform are not maximiz-
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ing profits, it might be interpreted as unintentionally incurring losses. However, the
same behavior may be utility maximizing if external motives are taken into account.
This can require additional empirical strategies to untangle (e.g., Freedman and Jin,
2014).
Reward-based platforms such as Kickstarter highlight this issue even more
starkly. For the same project a funder can 1) choose to give money and receive a
reward, 2) donate money with no reward, or 3) choose to donate more money than
is required for a specific reward. Depending on the ratio of the value of the expected
reward to the amount of money the funder provided, this action could represent a
range of purely external to purely internal motivation.
0.4 Conclusion and application to following chapters
This introductory essay has attempted to outline a simple framework for think-
ing about how crowdfunding platforms influence crowdfunding behavior. Each of
the following three chapters empirically explores how the motives of funders have
impacted the performance of loans on different peer-to-peer lending platforms. The
platforms studied in this dissertation share a common structure, but draw on slightly
different elements of the framework.
In the first chapter, I attempt to disentangle external rewards on a for-profit
peer-to-peer lending platform between consumption and investment motives. Draw-
ing on the distinction between taste-based and statistical discrimination (analogous
to consumption and investment behavior, respectively), I attempt to disentangle
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the importance of these mechanisms for how lenders interpret gender and the loca-
tion of borrowers. I find that gender decisions are driven by both consumption and
investment concerns, while geography is primarily used in the course of investment
decisions.
In the second chapter, I examine a tension that is derived from the hybrid
identity of a non-profit microfinance lending platform. Do lenders prefer recipients
who will be economically productive with their money or recipients who have the
greatest personal need? The structure of the platform allows for both types of
behavior. I employ an original survey and find diversity in this preference. Further,
the preference appears correlated with funding performance for borrowers.
In the final chapter, I present the results of an experiment where the structure
of a crowdfunding platform remains fixed, but the platform’s identity is experimen-
tally manipulated. The ratio of proposed internal and external returns to funders
is varied between the treatment and control groups. I measure whether this treat-
ment influences the propensity of subjects to create an account on the platform, and
find no difference between treatment and control. While the scope of this particu-
lar experiment is limited, the potential for similar randomized experimentation in

































Figure 0.1: Google Trends data for the term “crowdfunding.” Popularity as repre-
sented by worldwide search volume for the term has grown quickly since 2010. Plot









































































































































Figure 0.3: Potential funders choose crowdfunding platforms that maximize their
utility. Likewise, resource recipients choose platforms that are most likely to suc-
cessfully fulfill their request for capital.
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Chapter 1: Biases in Peer-to-peer Lending Markets: Tastes vs. In-
formation
1.1 Introduction
Researchers have demonstrated that audiences treat individuals and organi-
zations differently based on a range of attributes such as race (e.g., Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2004), gender (e.g., Goldin and Rouse, 2000), and geographic loca-
tion (e.g., McPherson et al., 2001), as well as status (e.g., Malter, 2014), category
membership (e.g., Zuckerman, 1999), and network position (e.g., Podolny, 2001).
Such research is frequently able to demonstrate the existence of disparate treatment
based on such attributes, but less successful at locating the underlying mechanisms
behind the treatment. This is critical because policy prescriptions at both the in-
dividual and organizational level hinge on the specific mechanisms that drive such
results.
Demographic biases in particular have received significant attention by social
scientists. Economists, sociologists, and psychologists have all addressed various
aspects of the topic (for partial disciplinary reviews, see Charles and Guryan, 2011;
Pager and Shepherd, 2008; Fiske, 2000). This is likely because demographic-based
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disparities are observed in a wide range of settings. Recent work by management
researchers is diverse and has ranged from explaining the patent output disparity
between male and female life scientists (Ding et al., 2006) to how the racial com-
position of employees is impacted by organizational hiring channels (Fernandez and
Greenberg, 2013).
However, determining the precise mechanisms behind this disparate treatment
has proven difficult for researchers. On the one hand, disparities may exist because
decision makers have a “taste” for one group over another (Becker, 1957). On the
other hand, demographics may be correlated with economic traits that would better
explain the disparity if such information were readily observable—what economists
term “statistical discrimination” because it is based on beliefs about the statistical
correlation between the category and an important economic trait (Phelps, 1972;
Arrow, 1973). This distinction regarding the source of bias is important because the
appropriate strategic response is directly contingent on why the bias is occurring.
In this paper I investigate the importance of two specific demographics—
gender and geography—in an online lending market. Employing data from a Chinese
peer-to-peer lending platform, I examine the extent to which demographics influence
the decisions of lenders and the motives for such behavior. For example, lenders may
treat male and female borrowers differently because they believe that one gender will
default on its loans less often than the other. Alternatively, or even simultaneously,
lenders may have a non-economic preference for one gender over the other.
To disentangle these explanations, I leverage the implementation of a loan
guarantee policy—what amounts to an insurance policy for lenders—to infer lender
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motivation by comparing pre- and post-policy time periods. The change in eco-
nomic risk between the two periods alters the value of the demographic information
itself and allows for a cleaner isolation of taste versus informational mechanisms
in the interpretation of demographics. In the pre-policy period, lenders may use
demographic information both as a proxy for unobserved economic traits and as a
means to enact non-economic preferences. In the post-policy period, however, the
nature of the demographic information has been altered so that it is less correlated
with likelihood of repayment. The “taste” of lenders then becomes a more plausible
explanation for disparities in borrower demographic outcomes.
Findings indicate a positive informational bias but negative taste bias for
women. Lenders seem to believe that women repay at higher rates but prefer men
when economic risks are equal. A “home bias” of lenders providing favorable treat-
ment to borrowers located within the same province, however, appears to be driven
primarily by informational bias and not taste. Disentangling these two mechanisms
is important to individual and organizational strategy to the extent it determines
the optimal response to such treatment. The policy prescription to address a taste
bias may be very different from an informational one. Therefore, first-order knowl-
edge that a disparate treatment exists is not sufficient; actors need to disentangle
the mechanisms before crafting a strategy.
The paper proceeds as follows. I first outline the two major theories of de-
mographic bias developed in the economics discipline and some recent empirical
attempts to untangle them. I then turn to the emerging crowdfunding research,
discuss the mechanisms of peer-to-peer lending, and introduce the specific Chinese
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context of this study. The data and empirical strategy are then presented along
with the results. I conclude with a discussion of how disentangling taste and infor-
mational mechanisms can help advance a wider range of organizational research.
1.2 Theory
I first discuss the work by economists aimed at understanding the source of
discrimination. This literature has historically been focused on how race and gender
influence labor market outcomes. I then discuss how these theories apply to the
more recent research on crowdfunding and peer-to-peer lending, and highlight the
theoretical importance of disentangling the taste and informational mechanisms.
1.2.1 Economic explanations of demographic disparities
Economists have proposed two separate explanations for observed demographic
disparities in markets. In the first, discrimination is a result of non-pecuniary utility
and may exist in a market even with assumptions of perfect information. Becker
(1957) developed this “tastes for discrimination” theory, where discrimination shifts
the perceived price of a choice from p to p(1+dk). Given a decision maker’s discrimi-
nation coefficient, dk, he or she faces perceived prices that are either higher (positive
dk; for example sexism) or lower (negative dk; for example nepotism) than the prices
faced by actors with a zero discrimination coefficient. This type of discrimination
is economically destructive but utility maximizing for the decision maker.
The second explanation for discrimination comes from the information-based
models developed by Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973), which demonstrate how cer-
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tain discriminatory behavior may be rational and profit maximizing if a market ex-
hibits imperfect information. In these models, decision makers act on beliefs about
the statistical correlation between demographic categories and other outcomes if
they are unable to observe the trait of interest directly. This “statistical discrim-
ination” can be observed in the car insurance industry where rates are higher for
younger male drivers than for older female drivers, because accidents have histor-
ically occurred at higher rates for the former group, and the insurer believes the
correlation will exist into the future.8 Rates would ideally be set based on a di-
rect measure of cautious driving, but demographic traits are used in the absence of
such information. Statistical discrimination is therefore profit maximizing for the
decision maker assuming that his or her beliefs about the future correlation prove
correct.9
The primacy of the demographic trait is therefore different between these two
explanations. In the case of statistical discrimination, the decision maker is agnostic
to the demographic trait and only employs it as a proxy for unobservables. The
demographic trait would be readily ignored if better information were available. In
the case of taste-based discrimination, however, it is the demographic factor itself
that alters overall utility.
8For example, the website of Allstate Corporation’s Esurance brand includes a section entitled
“why women pay less for car insurance,” which notes “There are 3 main categories that suggest
women are safer drivers than men: accidents, speeding, and DUI convictions.” This point is even
constructed in the parlance of counterfactuals: “If you’re a guy, all this really means is that a
female clone of yourself would likely pay less for car insurance.” See: https://www.esurance.
com/car-insurance-info/women-pay-less-for-car-insurance
9This practice is not without debate. The Court of Justice of the European Union ruled
gender-based price discrimination for insurance illegal beginning in December 2012. See: http:
//ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/unisex_insurance_en.pdf
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The difficulty of untangling these mechanisms in practice is that any single
outcome may be driven by a combination of the two. As Fernandez and Greenberg
(2013) recently noted, “Distinguishing between statistical and other forms of dis-
crimination has been extremely difficult to accomplish.” Nevertheless, a small body
of research is aimed specifically at that goal. One strategy is to look for variance in
the information available to decision makers, with an assumption that tastes are rel-
atively consistent across time. If the visibility of core economic information changes
across settings or time, then evidence for or against statistical or taste-based dis-
crimination may be revealed by corresponding changes in demographic disparities.
For example, Fernandez and Greenberg (2013) compare outcomes for job applicants
received either via referred or non-referred channels at a single company and find
that a racial gap for non-referred applicants disappears for referred applicants. They
argue that the relatively information-rich referral channel overcomes the statistical
discrimination against non-referred applicants. In another example, Siniver (2011)
exploits the introduction of a certification examination to untangle the source of
differential pay for immigrant versus native physicians in Israel. He finds that the
availability of information on underlying quality revealed by the exam explains the
previously identified pay gap (and thus supports a statistical discrimination inter-
pretation).
In a lending context, lenders may use demographic attributes as proxies for
other unobserved traits that they believe to be of primary economic interest. How-
ever, they may also exhibit taste-based favor or disfavor for a particular demo-
graphic. The “peer” aspect of peer-to-peer technologies makes this distinction even
24
more salient. Strategies to untangle these in a crowdfunding context are discussed
next.
1.2.2 Application to crowdfunding
The practice of crowdfunding involves a distributed set of individuals who
provide funds for specific projects or loans. In the case of peer-to-peer lending,
this involves matching individuals seeking loans to potential lenders. A number of
researchers have explored the question of who gets funded in peer-to-peer lending.
Pope and Sydnor (2011) and a working paper by Ravina (2012) both examine is-
sues similar to this research in the context of the Prosper.com marketplace—a U.S.
based peer-to-peer lending website. Both papers are concerned with the likelihood
of borrowers receiving a loan, the favorability of loan terms (a feature of the Pros-
per marketplace), and the average financial performance of different demographic
groups. A mismatch between how lenders treat the demographic category and that
demographic category’s future economic performance is interpreted as evidence of
taste-based discrimination. The difficulty with this approach is that it requires
assumptions about lender knowledge at the time of decision. Lender beliefs may
be incorrect and lenders may misestimate the correlation between demographics
and future repayment. Any number of mechanisms could cause this misestimation,
including a lack of lender expertise or a change in underlying market characteristics.
Without a change in information regimes it is difficult to untangle miscon-
ception by lenders from taste-based discrimination. Did lenders miss-price loans
based on incorrect beliefs (failed statistical discrimination), or did they intentionally
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choose an under-performing loan based on other characteristics (successful taste-
based discrimination)? Both scenarios may appear the same in the data to an
external researcher.
When assessing the importance of a trustworthy physical appearance in bor-
rower photographs, Duarte et al. (2012) conclude that “lenders do not fully account
for the lower probability of default among trustworthy borrowers and mistakenly
charge them interest rates that are too high.” A taste-based interpretation is also
consistent with the data though seemingly non-intuitive in that case (it would re-
quire lenders to have a taste for people that look untrustworthy). This issue is
more strongly highlighted in the Pope and Sydnor (2011) finding that the higher
rates charged to black borrowers do not fully offset the higher default rates of the
same borrowers once the loans mature (similar to the Theseira (2009) finding that
“the market appears to possess an inefficient degree of statistical discrimination”).
They note that “The problem, of course, is that once one allows for the possibility
of inaccurate beliefs, results from other studies that find evidence of taste-based or
accurate statistical discrimination come into question. Thus, the results from this
study suggest caution when interpreting evidence in favor of one theory of discrim-
ination versus another” (see Pope and Sydnor, 2011, p. 90 for full discussion). This
quote highlights the theoretical importance of beliefs in theories of discrimination.
Lender beliefs about future performance should be of more empirical interest than
their actual ability to predict loan performance.
Finally, the availability of lender demographic data is typically constrained
in peer-to-peer lending studies. The scope of most extant research has been on
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borrower demographics, with some exceptions, such as Ravina (2012) who leverages
demographics for the sub-sample of lenders that have also registered as borrowers. If
taste-based preferences do exist in a market, then explaining their ultimate source
is complicated and beyond the scope of this paper (hence “tastes” as a catch-all
term). However, sociologists have produced a large body of literature documenting
the positive correlations between network ties and demographic similarity (McPher-
son et al., 2001), and psychologists have conducted extensive research on ingroup
psychological processes related to prejudices, stereotypes, and discrimination (Fiske,
2000).
Gender in crowdfunding has drawn specific research interest given what some
see as the potential of the technology to help women better access financing (e.g.,
see working papers by Marom et al., 2014; Greenberg and Mollick, 2014). Green-
berg and Mollick (2014) demonstrate that choice homophily is an important element
of understanding gender disparities on Kickstarter, and the effect (what they term
“activist homophily”) is even responsible for providing women a relative advantage
in categories where women are under represented (e.g., technology). Similarly, the
role of geography in peer-to-peer marketplaces has produced considerable research
interest given the ability of the technology to dramatically alter geographic search
costs (e.g., see working papers by Agrawal et al., 2011; Lin and Viswanathan, 2013).
This interest is grounded in the finance literature which has a long history of re-
searching the role of geography in influencing investment decisions. Individuals and
to a lesser extent institutional investors exhibit a “home bias” when they dispro-
portionately invest in nearby firms (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). Even before
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the rise of peer-to-peer lending technology, the increasing availability of information
meant that the average distance between small businesses and their lenders was
increasing (Petersen and Rajan, 2002). Therefore, it is clear that both gender and
geographic biases may be influenced by both taste and informational mechanisms.
1.3 Empirical setting
The lending and borrowing of money is one of the most basic features of an
economy, but technological advancements have significantly altered the transaction
costs and market frictions of the process. Individual borrowers and lenders can now
directly participate in debt financing through mediated online platforms. In some
regards, these new developments still mirror the basic processes found in centuries-
old person-to-person kinship and village-based lending networks. In other elements,
the geographically decentralized and relatively anonymous nature of the markets
allows for the formation of lending ties across a much greater span of demographics
than would otherwise be possible. This study examines peer-to-peer lending, one
element of this broader shift.
In a stylized version of peer-to-peer lending, a mediating “platform” accepts
applications from potential borrowers, screens them, posts them on a website for
lenders to peruse and select from, and then facilitates the transfer of money from
lenders to borrowers and borrowers back to lenders. Loan requests are fulfilled
in a piecemeal fashion, where many lenders each contribute a portion of a given
borrower’s total loan request. Once the full loan request is met, the loan is closed and
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the platform facilitates the transfer of funds from the lenders to the borrower. The
platform then facilitates the collection of loans and periodic borrower repayments.
In addition to the studies mentioned above, a broader body of work has begun to
explore the range and scope of behavior on such platforms (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2011;
Freedman and Jin, 2011; Lin et al., 2013; Mollick, 2014; Zhang and Liu, 2012).
The prototypical and earliest peer-to-peer lending platforms in the United
States were Propser.com, Lending Club, and the 501(c)(3) platform Kiva.org, which
is designed for non-profit lending. Prosper and Kiva were both founded in late 2005,
however for-profit lending is not yet legal in all states.10 A handful of other platforms
cater to niche markets such as student loans or medical procedures.11
This study takes place in the context of an online for-profit peer-to-peer lending
platform in China. Chinese peer-to-peer (“个人对个人” or “individual to individ-
ual”) lending differs from the American context in a number of ways. This is partly
due to differences in the historical development of the financial services industry
in China and partly from looser present-day regulatory constraints. In the United
States, peer-to-peer lending companies rely on existing credit scores to screen po-
tential borrowers.12 China lacks an extensive national credit scoring system such
as the FICO score, so the role of peer-to-peer lending companies is broader than in
the United States and includes more intensive verification of borrower backgrounds.
10For example, as of June 2014 twenty states still did not allow lending on Prosper.com.
11The Government Accountability Office (2011) provides an overview of the history and evolving
regulatory environment of the American peer-to-peer lending industry.
12For example, as of June 2014, “A new Prosper borrower must be a U.S. resident in a state
where Prosper loans are available, and must have a bank account, a Social Security number, and
a credit score of at least 640. Prosper uses Experian to obtain credit scores.” Source: https:
//www.prosper.com/help/borrowing/
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The most obvious industry difference between the United States and China is the
existence of both online and offline peer-to-peer lending. Offline lending consists of
either visiting physical offices to borrow and lend money or the use of a field sales
force (offline lending is not examined in this study).
American peer-to-peer lenders technically invest in promissory notes sold by
the peer-to-peer platforms, which are tied to the repayment of specific loans that
are issued by a bank.13 In China, however, the platforms more directly facilitate the
transfer of money between lender and borrower. In theory, this results in less regu-
lation since it amounts to activity outside of traditional banking institutions. This
is observable in company names. For example, Ppdai, one of the first peer-to-peer
lending platforms in China, is registered as Shanghai Ppdai Financial Information
Service Co., Ltd.14 The business name of the company in this study includes “com-
mercial advising.” Therefore, at the time of the study the industry still occupied
an uncertain space in the broader scope of Chinese financial services with most
platforms functioning as some form of financial information or advising company.
The number of online Chinese peer-to-peer platforms increased rapidly from
just nine in 2009 to 132 in the first quarter of 2013 (Li, 2013). Some media reports
put the value of peer-to-peer loans issued in China at US$11 billion, an almost three-
fold increase over the previous year (Zhu, 2014). Despite this rapid development,
the Chinese context has been employed in few studies (for an exception, see Xu et
13Both Propser and LendingClub use WebBank, an FDIC-insured institution. Kiva loans are
distributed and collected through partner microfinance institutions.
14“上海拍拍贷金融信息服务有限公司” Source: Shanghai Administration of Industry and Com-
merce using Ppdai’s company registration number: 310115001783417
http://www.sgs.gov.cn/lz/etpsInfo.do?method=index
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al., 2011; Chen et al., 2014). Regulatory constraints typically limit the operations
of such firms to national borders meaning there is no international competition.
A tradition of heavy state involvement in the Chinese financial system increased
the attractiveness of these companies to both lenders and borrowers. State-owned
banks both offered low interest rates to investors and preferential lending to state-
owned enterprises, making it difficult for individuals and small businesses to procure
bank loans. This drove overall demand for financial innovations such as peer-to-peer
lending. It is against this institutional backdrop that this study takes place.
Data for this study was collected from a platform that began offering peer-
to-peer lending services in 2010. At its founding, loans were not guaranteed and
functioned similar to US-based platforms such as Prosper.com (although to my
knowledge never featured competitive bidding on interest rates). It first imple-
mented a loan repayment guarantee policy in the first half of 2011 when total loan
volume was still low. In early January 2012 the company updated its loan guaran-
tee policy to cover loans of all credit rating levels. These types of loan guarantee
policies were common in the industry as a way to assuage fears about repayment
and attract new lenders. For example, competitor Ppdai began offering a princi-
ple guarantee in July of 2011.15 Because of the lack of a comprehensive national
credit scoring system, lenders have always had to place trust in the peer-to-peer
companies to perform proper due diligence on potential borrowers. Therefore, the
guarantees acted as a mechanism to demonstrate that the companies’ incentive to
15Source: http://help.ppdai.com/helpdetail/335, “本金保障计划是拍拍贷于 2011 年 7 月
发起的，旨在促使借出者分散投资，保障投资收益。”
31
perform adequate due diligence on borrowers was aligned with that of lenders.
1.4 Empirical strategy
1.4.1 Data
The dataset consists of all investment decisions made on the platform along
with demographic characteristics of both borrowers and lenders. The unit of analysis
is the lender-borrower dyad. Each dyad represents a decision by a specific lender to
loan to a specific borrower and includes the date and time the investment was made
and the size of the investment. Investment decisions are only possible for loans that
have not already been fully funded. According to the company, borrower data is
typically verified (and visible to lenders to use while making decisions) while lender
data is self-reported. This results in more complete demographic data for borrowers
than lenders, but nevertheless provides significant visibility to the demographics on
both sides of the dyad.
1.4.1.1 Dependent variable
The main outcome of interest is the amount a lender decided to lend to a
specific loan request. This decision is contingent on a lender first having the ability
to loan to a specific borrower (i.e., a loan request has not already been filled) and
then deciding whether and at what amount to make a loan to the borrower. If a
lender invested in the same loan more than once, the total amount invested in that
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loan by the lender is aggregated for purposes of analysis.16 By using the loan size
decision instead of other outcomes such as the overall choice of borrower, it is largely
possible to sidestep the selection and timing effects that are difficult to control for
using a one-sided matching model. Further, the speed at which borrowers are funded
and the relatively constrained supply of borrowers in this particular context make the
loan size decision a more practical metric. If anything, this should understate actual
biases, as very biased lenders may choose to avoid certain borrowers altogether.
1.4.1.2 Independent variables
I explore the role of two demographic variables in this paper: gender and
geography. These particular traits were chosen because they speak to current man-
agement and organizational research on inequality in markets. The gender analysis
consists of borrower gender and borrower gender interacted with lender gender. The
geographic analysis examines the possibility of “home bias”—a differential treatment
of borrowers located in the same location as a lender. I construct a binary variable
of Geographic Overlap that equals one if the lender shared the borrower’s province
(i.e., the lender’s work or home province overlaps with the publicly visible borrower’s
work province). I interact these demographic variables with a binary variable equal
to one in the post-policy period to untangle the taste and informational biases.
16This occurs with some frequency in the data. An employee of the company indicated that
because loans are sometimes funded almost instantaneously, a prospective lender may first attempt
a smaller sized investment than his/her actual target and then repeat the process until they have
either invested their desired amount in the loan or other lenders have already fully satisfied the
loan request. Lenders may even use third-party software tools for this purpose, though this is
discouraged by the company.
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1.4.2 Research design
The goal of this study is to disentangle the degree to which taste and infor-
mational mechanisms drive biased behavior in this market. In most settings these
two mechanisms are confounded, meaning that even experimental evidence that
audiences impart disparate treatment based on an attribute does not necessarily
explain why audiences respond to that attribute. What is required to disentangle
the mechanisms is a change in environments: from a confounded environment where
either or both mechanisms may be driving an observed disparity, to an environment
where only a single mechanism is plausibly present. A difference-in-differences be-
tween two such environments can then be employed to separate each mechanism.
Conceptually, this second environment should alter the economic cost of employ-
ing an attribute in a decision to be either infinitely small or infinitely large. If the
economic cost of using an attribute approaches zero, then any remaining disparate
treatment can be interpreted as the result of a taste mechanism, because the poten-
tial economic differences are now normalized to zero. Likewise, if the economic cost
of using an attribute approaches infinity, then the cost of exerting tastes becomes
prohibitive, and disparate treatment will be the result of information mechanisms.
This study employs the first of these environments, a setting where the cost of
employing specific attributes in a decision is normalized to zero. In early January
2012 the company updated its loan principle repayment guarantee policy. For prac-
tical purposes, this guarantee amounted to an insurance policy for lenders. Unlike
an existing policy implemented in the first half of 2011, this new policy covered
34
every loan on the platform (the previous policy did not cover HR loans). It was
funded by assessing service fees on loans ranging from 0% to 5% depending on the
company-assigned credit rating of the loan. Assuming lenders believed the guar-
antee, it largely removed the economic rationale for lending to one borrower over
another.17 Therefore, statistical and taste-based discrimination are confounded in
the pre-policy period, but biases should be primarily driven by taste-based consid-
erations in the post-policy period. That is, in the pre-policy period, the decision
size of lender i to borrower j is a function of both the lender’s personal expecta-
tions about that borrower’s repayment at a future date t+ k and the lender’s time
invariant tastes:
Decisioni,j,t = f(E(repaymentj,t+k), tastei) (1.1)
In the post-policy period, decision size is no longer a function of expected
repayment.
Decisioni,j,t = f(tastei) (1.2)
A difference-in-differences design using 30-day windows on either side of the
policy is implemented to measure the change between pre- and post-period biases.
The demographic disparity in the post-policy period will be interpreted as the level
of taste-based bias. The difference in the disparities between each of the two periods
17It is worth noting that loan collection outside of the platform was never practically feasible.
Therefore, even in the pre-policy period lenders had to trust that the company was honest and
would be able to collect repayments over the life of the loan.
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(the difference-in-differences) will be interpreted as the level of informational bias.
This research design is summarized in Table 1.1.
Employing limited 30-day windows on either side of the policy change strength-
ens the identification in two ways. First, it limits the potential influence of other
concurrent events in the firm, industry, or broader economy. Second, it limits the
potential for lender learning, which should theoretically alter informational bias-
ing behaviors. Prior studies have noted such learning processes (e.g., Altonji and
Pierret, 2001; Freedman and Jin, 2011), but lenders must wait extended periods of
time to observe loan performance. After the policy change, lenders should still be
influenced by two readily observable but easily controlled-for economic traits: the
interest rate of the loan and the loan repayment term. The decision size may also be
influenced by the total amount of money requested for the loan (i.e., for larger loans
there is a higher ceiling on the decision, lowering the possibility of right-truncation).
1.4.3 Methods
Crosstab averages of pre- and post-policy average decision sizes for each gender
and the presence of geographic similarity are first calculated. A set of OLS models
is then developed to complement these simple averages. Equations 1.3 and 1.4
represent the general form of these models, where DecisionSizeij is the amount
of money that lender i loaned to borrower j, Genderj is whether borrower j is
female, GeoOverlapi,j is whether lender i and borrower j share geographic overlap,
Policy{0,1} is a dummy variable for whether the decision was made during the post-
policy period, and Xj is observable characteristics of the pertinent loan: the interest
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rate, term of the loan, size of the requested loan, and credit rating category. Xj is
later expanded during additional empirical tests.
DecisionSizeij = Policy +Genderj + Policy ∗Genderj +Xj (1.3)
DecisionSizeij = Policy +GeoOverlap+ Policy ∗GeoOverlap+Xj (1.4)
1.4.4 Descriptive statistics
Lenders made 25,440 decisions to lend across 558 loans. Approximately 8% of
these decisions shared geographic overlap and 14% of the loans were female. Table
1.2 summarizes the 25,440 lender decisions across the two 30-day periods (10,975 in
the pre-policy period and 14,465 in the post-policy period). Figure 1.1 summarizes
the dependent variable by plotting the average size of investment decisions and the
total number of investment decisions over the course of the window analyzed for the
policy change. There is not a clear trend in terms of the average loan size. The
average investment size is 882 RMB in the 30 days before compared to 865 RMB in
the 30 days after. However, Figure 1.1 shows that the absolute number of decisions
is greater in the second period and highlights the volatility in loan supply, with
some days where no loans were made at all. Table 1.3 employs an OLS regression
to summarize the impact of the policy on lenders’ loan decision sizes accounting for
available control information. The lack of significance on the policy coefficient in
most models indicates the policy itself had limited impact on the size of lenders’
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investment decisions during the study period.
Table 1.4 summarizes the 558 individual loans in the windows (317 in the
pre-policy period and 241 in the post-policy period). The overall loan interest rates
varied from 6.1% to 24.4% with the most common categories of 13% and 15%. Loan
sizes also varied greatly, from 3,000 to 500,000 RMB, however the majority of loans
were small and fell into either the 3,000 or 5,000 RMB categories (approximately
$480 and $800, respectively). The loan terms ranged from three to twenty-four
months, with the majority being three or six month loans. Most loans were funded
very quickly, with an average of just over eight hours. This statistic combined with
an average of just over nine available loans per day indicates that lenders did not
have a substantial opportunity to actively choose between many borrowers at the
time of their decisions.
Tables 1.5 through 1.7 provide additional information on the 558 loans that
were open for lending at some point during the experimental window. Table 1.5
shows that only 25 of the total 558 loans ended up as “bad debt”. Table 1.6 lists the
purposes of the loans, the majority of which were used for short-term turnover. Table
1.7 shows the distribution of the company-assigned credit rating ranging from AA
(highest quality) to HR (high risk) along with summarized loan characteristics for
each category. The pool of loans grows progressively larger as the quality decreases,
and as expected, so does the average interest rate.
Table 1.8 summarizes the number of lenders that were active in both periods
versus only the pre- or post-policy window. It is conceivable that the set of lenders
may be different in each period because of the policy. A reasonable model of lender
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behavior is a two stage choice, where a lender first decides if he or she wants to lend
through a specific platform and then decides the details of the actual investment
decision. Therefore, the study needs to be cognizant of lender self-selection effects
at the platform level. Table 1.8 indicates that the number of new users increased
following the policy change (see table footnote), however, this increase is surely
confounded with the natural platform growth process.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Gender
Table 1.9 presents a crosstab summary of average decision sizes to male and
female borrowers in the pre- and post-policy periods. Table 1.10 further divides
the data by the gender of the lender. From Tables 1.9 and 1.10 it is clear that
the majority of lenders and borrowers are male, and the average investment size
is greater for women in the pre-policy period but slightly greater for men in the
post-policy period.
Table 1.11 represents different versions of the OLS model detailed in Equation
1.3. Model 1 reproduces the crosstab calculations from Table 1.9. The coefficients
on the interaction terms can be used to shed light on the relative amounts of statis-
tical and taste-based bias in the market. From theory, the taste-based component
can be interpreted as the difference between women and men when the policy is in
place. In Model 1 of Table 1.11, this is equal to the sum of the gender coefficient
Borrower sex (female) and the coefficient on the Borrower sex * policy interaction
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term. This -150 RMB (272 minus 422) indicates that women are negatively discrim-
inated against when there are no economic repercussions for doing so. To infer the
level of informational bias, I examine the inverse of the coefficient on the interaction
term. This positive 422 RMB indicates that lenders believe women borrowers to
be preferable to men when economic risks are present. It is worth noting that this
coefficient is larger than the 272 RMB (1103 minus 831 RMB) preference that might
be inferred from simply comparing female and male borrowers’ averages in the pre-
policy period from Table 1.9. Model 2 adds the economic controls, which reduce the
economic significance but do not change the overall direction of the result. Model 3
incorporates the gender of the lender and indicates that female lenders make smaller
decisions after the policy, but otherwise the differences observed in Table 1.10 are
not statistically meaningful.
Lenders appear to believe that women repay at higher rates than men, but
nevertheless hold some form of taste-based bias against them. This is consistent
with the traditional microfinance narrative of women being economically superior
borrowers to men despite cultural discrimination against them (Roodman, 2012).
It is interesting to note that in this context the profit maximizing bias for women
appears to overwhelm the taste-based bias against women. Further, without this
deliberate attempt to untangle the two mechanisms, there is no ex-ante reason to
believe that taste-based bias exists in the market.
The relatively low default rate of the sample prevents fully implementing the
statistical approach of the studies mentioned previously, where loan decisions are
correlated with future defaults to infer economic rationality. However, the data from
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default rates does not refute the interpretation that lenders are indeed economically
“correct” in their positive informational bias for women. From Table 1.5, only one
of the 25 borrowers that eventually defaulted was a woman.
1.5.2 Geography
Lenders and borrowers share geography in around 8–9% percent of investment
decisions. Table 1.12 tabulates the basic pre- and post-policy decision size averages
when such geographic overlap occurs and shows that the average investment size
is 80% larger when such overlap exists in the pre-policy period but only 5% larger
in the post-policy period. This indicates significant informational bias but limited
taste bias.
Different versions of the OLS model detailed in Equation 1.4 regressing geo-
graphic overlap on decision size are reported in Table 1.13. Model 1 replicates the
crosstabs of Table 1.12 and indicates that in the pre-policy period lenders made on
average 644 RMB (80%) larger loans to borrowers that shared their geography (the
coefficient on Geographic overlap). The coefficient on the difference-in-differences
between the two periods of -600 RMB indicates that the impact of geography greatly
decreased with the implementation of the policy. The inverse of this coefficient
(positive 600 RMB) represents the level of informational bias. The imputed level
of taste-based local bias is therefore just 44 RMB (644 minus 600). Most of the
pre-policy positive geographic bias therefore appears to be from informational pro-
cesses and not taste, and indicates that “home bias” is driven by beliefs about better
repayment prospects rather than some type of social homophily. This general result
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holds when controls are introduced in Models 2 and 3, though the taste component
actually becomes slightly negative.
1.6 Additional empirical tests
1.6.1 Model specification
A fundamental challenge in studies of demographic disparities is understand-
ing what exactly a demographic attribute represents. Even variables such as race
present serious taxonomical challenges, where definitions change over time and it
is not always apparent what category membership entails or how the information
is interpreted (Charles and Guryan, 2011). To further complicate matters, most
demographics are heavily confounded with other demographics: e.g., if lenders pre-
fer people with short hair it might show up as gender discrimination even though
gender is not what is directly being acted upon. Therefore, it is impossible to ever
be certain how lenders fully interpret such demographic information. These issues
are important because they influence what an “ideal” model specification should
look like.
In the preceding sections I separately analyzed each of the demographic traits
of interest. I next construct a model with nearly all of the available information
simultaneously included. Table 1.14 presents these results. Both sets of coefficients
on the gender and geography variables are consistent with the prior results.
42
1.6.2 Policy treatment specifications
Because policy changes such as the one in this study are not experimentally
exogenous, I also construct and test two “placebo” policy dates. The first placebo
test sets the treatment date one month before the actual date and compares the 30-
day windows on either side; the actual pre-policy period becomes the post-placebo
period in this design. The second placebo treatment employs the same approach but
moves the treatment date to one month after the actual date, so that the actual post-
policy period becomes a pre-placebo period. This design is summarized in Figure
1.2. The more fully specified model detailed above in Section 1.6.1 is replicated for
each of the placebo tests, and these results are presented in Tables 1.15 and 1.16.
Only one or two coefficients remain significant in each of the two placebo periods,
reducing the likelihood that the original results presented in Table 1.14 were the
result of a spurious process.
I next investigate whether the credit rating of the loans influences the results,
given that the updated guarantee policy covered loans with an HR (“high risk”)
credit rating while the previous policy did not. To test for this, I split the the
sample into two separate groups: 1) loans with a credit rating of AA through E,
and 2) loans with a credit rating of HR. Table 1.17 presents this analysis. The
non-HR subset maintains the same general pattern of the previous results, while the
subset of HR-only loans does not generate significant coefficients. However, the HR
subset may present sample size challenges. For example, only 317 of the total 3,755
HR decisions were from lenders lending to borrowers in the same province. Also,
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the HR loans may not contain the same variance on other dimensions (e.g., loan
size; see Table 1.7). If the effect is heterogeneous across other loan attributes then
this may also be contributing to this result.
1.6.3 Behavioral change versus selection
The preceding analysis indicates that borrowers face different conditions before
and after the policy introduction. This effect could be driven by multiple scenarios.
One possibility is that a fixed group of lenders changed its behavior based on the
policy. A second possibility is that the policy itself attracted or repelled specific
lenders with a different set of preferences. Table 1.8 indicates about half of all
unique lenders active during the study period made loans both pre- and post-policy.
Therefore, it is also possible that both scenarios are occurring simultaneously.
Lender fixed effects are employed to approach this question. The main chal-
lenge to employing lender fixed effects in this context is the extent to which it
restricts the sample. Even when analyzing gender and geography separately, a
lender must have made at least four loans to possess enough variance across the
independent variables. For gender this comprises at least one decision to a man and
one decision to a woman in both the pre- and post-policy periods. Limiting the
data to such lenders results in 405 lenders who make 11,874 total decisions across
the span of the two windows (less than 50% of the original sample). The average
number of decisions for these lenders to each gender in each period is calculated in
Table 1.18. The previous gender regression is then rerun (excluding lender gender
which is collinear with a lender fixed effect) using this subsample and reported in
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Table 1.19. The effects are the same direction, but the interaction term is no longer
statistically significant. This seems to indicate that at least some of the disparity
is generated by a change in behavior for the specific lenders that are active in both
periods.
I repeat this process for the geographic analysis by limiting the dataset to
lenders that have made loans to at least one person in their same province and one
person in a different province in both the pre- and post-policy periods. This greatly
reduces the sample to just 219 lenders who made a total of 7,190 decisions across
the span of the two windows. The average number of decisions for these lenders
is calculated in Table 1.20, and the regression results are presented in Table 1.21.
Neither the subsample itself (Model 1) nor the subsample with fixed effects (Model
2) has significant coefficients, even though the direction remains the same. Thus,
the data are unable to provide a conclusive answer to the amount of selection versus
treatment effect from the policy.
1.6.4 Sample heterogeneity
It is plausible that the measured effect is not observed equally across the range
of decisions. To test for this, I exclude small loans and small decisions from the anal-
ysis with the assumption that the bias effect may not be present for situations where
limited cognitive effort is exerted or the economic stakes are exceedingly low. Table
1.22 details the results when only analyzing decisions equal to or greater than 100
RMB and loans equal to or greater than 20,000 RMB; this results in around 16,000
decisions. Although the statistical significance of the pre-policy positive bias is lower
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in the models without controls, the magnitudes of the previously observed effects
are in general larger for this subset. This indicates the effect is more pronounced at
the higher end of the decision distribution.
1.7 Discussion
It is often easier to demonstrate the existence of disparities than it is to sub-
stantiate the specific mechanisms that produce such outcomes. These mechanisms,
however, play a critical role in both theory and practice and were the impetus for
this paper. An understanding of why disparate treatment exists allows members
of an affected group to strategically react to knowledge about disparities that af-
fect them. It also provides direction to organizational managers and policy makers
regarding what specific strategies would be most effective for altering such biases.
In this study I examined the role of lender motives in producing demographic
disparities for borrowers by leveraging a change in the economic value of demo-
graphic information. This approach requires fewer ex-ante assumptions about deci-
sion maker beliefs than would be the case without an information change. Findings
indicate that lenders in this context are indeed cognizant of borrower demographic
traits and employ demographics both as informational signals about the economic
favorability of borrowers and to express taste-based preferences. This research de-
sign strategy may be applicable to a wider range of settings where a change in the
economic value of the demographic information itself allows a researcher to infer
motives that are otherwise unobservable. Any setting where a policy normalizes
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risks at an individual level is a potential candidate for this approach.
This study also speaks to current challenges in the literatures studying status,
categories, and networks, where similar underlying informational and taste mecha-
nisms may also drive results and therefore moderate the importance of such topics
as standalone theories. For example, status rankings may simply serve as proxies
for unobserved quality that would be ignored if better information were available.
On the other hand, audiences may derive direct utility from interacting with high
status actors. Malter (2014) attempts to isolate how status matters in the wine
industry by separating product quality from brand status. He notes of the Podolny
(1993) view of status, “audiences would not have to rely on status to infer quality
if quality were perfectly observable” (Malter, 2014, p. 276), while he empirically
demonstrates that conspicuous consumption clearly matters and status—at least in
the wine industry—matters in its own right.
The categories literature faces a similar challenge, where category membership
can either serve as a fundamental trait itself—for example, by creating an illegiti-
macy discount from not belonging to an established category (Zuckerman, 1999)—or
is simply used as a shortcut for quality; perhaps because low-quality actors have dif-
ficulty positioning themselves in certain categories. Recent work by Pontikes (2012)
demonstrates how venture capitalists prefer more ambiguous classification, while
consumers prefer less ambiguous classification. Classification appears to serve as a
signal that can be used toward different ends by different audiences and therefore
may be a strong informational mechanism.
Finally, the networks literature highlights how network position can serve as a
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quality signal—the “prism” element of networks, where “a tie between two market
actors is an informational cue on which others rely to make inferences about the
underlying quality of one or both of the market actors” (Podolny, 2001, p. 34). At
the same time, popularity (as represented by metrics such as centrality) might be
valued for popularity’s sake alone. The positive relationship on Twitter between
message dissemination and number of followers might be one such example (Suh
et al., 2010). Therefore, one direction for future work in the status, categories,
and networks literatures is to more explicitly separate the informational and taste
aspects of these theories. Such separation will improve the ability of these theories
to make appropriate policy prescriptions.
Finally, managers of many organizations encounter issues of bias within their
ranks, and this study highlights the practical importance of locating its cause before
designing an organizational remedy. Any managerial attempt to promote diversity or
limit biases, such as the types of interventions studied by Kalev et al. (2006), needs
to account for the distinction between informational and taste mechanisms. For
example, informational biases may be best overcome by increasing the availability
of underlying quality information, while taste bias likely requires a fundamentally
different type of educational program to alter preferences. The finding by Kalev et
al. (2006) that the diversity training programs they analyzed were largely ineffective
is also consistent with an environment where managers or trainers did not properly
identify the sources of employee bias before enacting a solution. At an individual or
entrepreneur level, this might include attempting to alter the manner in which one’s
demographic information is portrayed or actively avoiding or seeking out particular
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markets based on the mechanisms at work in those markets. This research provides
guidance in developing such strategies.
1.7.1 Limitations
While this study sheds light on the importance of disentangling taste and infor-
mational mechanisms, it does not make detailed predictions about which mechanism
will necessarily dominate ex-ante. However, it does highlight some elements of this
question that may guide future research. In settings where a decision maker is not
constrained by strong economic penalties, one can expect taste to play a larger role
than would otherwise be expected.
Caution should be taken when attempting to generalize these direct results
to other settings, as these empirical results represent just one particular setting.
There are reasons to believe that the cultural context, industry dynamics, and other
factors should influence the specific ratio or existence of each of these mechanisms.
The approach to separate them, however, is likely generalizable to a wide range of
settings.
Finally, this study treats taste and information as additive, though recent work
in behavioral economics indicates that this is not strictly true for all economic and
social decisions. For example, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) show that a monetary
fine imposed for late pickups at a childcare center actually increases the occurrence
of late pickup. One explanation is that the imposition of an economic cost reshaped
the informal social contract that existed in the absence of a fine; it reduced the guilt
associated with a late pickups. Such research violates the assumption of this and
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other studies that taste is constant and not instantaneously manipulable. While the
policy change leveraged in this study seems unlikely to fundamentally alter tastes












































Figure 1.1: Temporal descriptive stats for the 30 days +/- the policy change.
Smoothed with generalized additive models using basis dimension k = 50. His-









Figure 1.2: Summary of the two placebo treatment robustness tests in relation to
the main research design. Placebo 1 shifts the treatment date to one month earlier
than the actual date. Placebo 2 shifts the treatment date to one month later. The
subsequent regression results of this design are presented in Tables 1.15 and 1.16.
52
Table 1.1: Research design employing 30-day pre- and post-policy windows to isolate
levels of taste-based versus informational biases.
Average size of lenders’ investment decisions
t1: pre-policy t2: post-policy
Demographic category A A1 A2
Demographic category B B1 B2
Taste-based bias for A = A2 −B2
Information bias for A = (A1 −B1)− (A2 −B2)
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Number of decisions 10975 14465 25440
Avg investment size 882 865 872
Max investment size 1e+05 8e+04 1e+05
Min investment size 50 50 50
Stdev investment size 3220 2979 3085
Unique lenders in window 2090 2521 3087
Unique loans in window 319 241 558
Avg. int. rate 13.9 14.3 14.1
Avg. loan term (months) 8.1 9.3 8.8
% same geography 9.0 7.6 8.2
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Table 1.3: Descriptive regressions of loan guarantee, borrower characteristics, and
lender characteristics on investment decision size
DV: decision size (Chinese RMB)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Guarantee policy (true) −17.2 −64.5 −121.3∗∗ −6.7
(39.1) (40.5) (58.7) (69.9)
Loan int rate 41.5∗∗∗ 38.4∗∗ 29.9∗
(12.0) (15.0) (17.9)
Loan term (months) 15.2∗∗ 7.2 8.4
(5.9) (7.6) (9.0)
Loan size 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 882.1∗∗∗ 920.0∗∗ 1, 341.6 −603.4
(29.5) (438.1) (1, 068.1) (1, 320.9)
Credit rating controls§ No Yes Yes Yes
Loan purpose controls No No Yes Yes
Borrower demographics† No No Yes Yes
Lender demographics‡ No No No Yes
Observations 25,440 25,440 24,212 15,268
R2 0.000 0.01 0.01 0.04
Adjusted R2 -0.000 0.01 0.01 0.03
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
§One of seven company-assigned credit rating cat-
egories: AA, A, B, C, D, E, or HR.
†Borrower demographics include gender, age, mar-
ital status, work province, academic achievement,
office cateogry (type, size, and industry), salary
range, loan purpose category, ownership of car and
house, children.
‡Lender demographics include gender, age, mar-
riage status, work province, and academic achieve-
ment. Missing self-reported lender data results in
the reduction of observations.
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Number of loans 317 241 558
Number of unique borrowers 242 214 420
% loans male 86.4 85.9 86.2
% loans female 13.6 14.1 13.8
Avg. int. rate 14.3 14.3 14.3
Avg. loan term (months) 6.7 7.6 7.0
Avg. total loan size (RMB) 30542 51918 39774
Max total loan size (RMB) 500000 500000 500000
Min total loan size (RMB) 3000 3000 3000
Avg. borrower age 32.3 35.1 33.5
Avg. fund time (hours) 6.4 10.5 8.2
Avg. unique lenders / loan 34.6 60.0 45.6
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Table 1.5: Loan outcomes as of August 2013
Category ... Loan count Male % Female %
已结标 Already complete (success) 524 85.9 14.1
坏账 Bad debt 25 96.0 4.0
还款中 In repayment 8 75.0 25.0
逾期 Overdue 1 100.0 0.0
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Table 1.6: Distribution of loan use categories
Category Loan count Pre-policy Post-policy
Short-term turnover 259 97 162
Personal consumption 155 145 10
Other 75 47 28
Startup investment 55 23 32
Redecoration 6 2 4
Wedding preparations 3 2 1
Education/training 2 1 1
Automobile 2 0 2
Housing 1 0 1
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Table 1.7: Statistics on credit rating categories
Credit rating Number of loans Int rate % Loan term Loan size
AA 3 6.9 3.0 4,333
A 2 13.0 9.0 42,500
B 65 11.4 7.4 31,708
C 87 13.3 7.4 43,393
D 119 13.7 7.5 67,159
E 135 14.9 7.4 40,273
HR 147 16.2 6.0 19,259
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Table 1.8: Number of unique active lenders in respective windows
Note: does not account for activity that is outside the experimental window. A lender who is active
just before the policy and then again at window + 1 will be counted above as active pre-policy
only.
Period of activity Lender count Avg. age % lenders female
Pre-policy window only 566 33.5 21.4
Both pre and post windows 1,524 33.8 22.5
Post-policy window only 997 32.7 28.6
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Table 1.9: Basic exposition of gender effects not accounting for lender gender
Borrower Post-policy Avg. investment Decision count
M FALSE 831.2 8,917
M TRUE 884.1 12,621
F FALSE 1,103.0 2,058
F TRUE 733.7 1,844
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Table 1.10: Basic exposition of gender effects accounting for lender gender
Lender Borrower Post-policy Avg. investment Decision count
M M FALSE 815.4 7,042
M M TRUE 939.4 9,596
M F FALSE 1,127.2 1,613
M F TRUE 803.2 1,398
F M FALSE 890.5 1,875
F M TRUE 708.9 3,025
F F FALSE 1,015.2 445
F F TRUE 515.9 446
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Table 1.11: Regression of loan policy and gender on investment size decision
DV: decision size (Chinese RMB)
(1) (2) (3)
Guarantee policy (true) 53.0 −20.8 48.2
(42.7) (45.0) (50.4)
Borrower sex (female) 271.8∗∗∗ 184.9∗∗ 227.7∗∗∗
(75.4) (76.5) (85.9)
Borrower sex * policy −422.3∗∗∗ −221.9∗∗ −258.9∗∗
(107.7) (110.6) (124.9)
Lender sex (female) 71.9
(79.8)
Lender sex * policy −293.9∗∗∗
(102.2)
Lender sex * borrower sex −199.8
(182.6)
Lender sex * borrower sex * policy 178.3
(255.5)
Loan interest rate 42.1∗∗∗ 41.1∗∗∗
(12.1) (12.1)
Loan term 13.6∗∗ 13.3∗∗
(6.0) (6.0)
Loan size 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 831.2∗∗∗ 882.2∗∗ 883.8∗∗
(32.7) (438.3) (438.8)
Controls for credit rating No Yes Yes
Observations 25,440 25,440 25,440
R2 0.001 0.01 0.01
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.01 0.01
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.12: Crosstabs of geographic overlap, policy change, and investment size
Geographic overlap Post-policy Avg investment size Decision count
FALSE FALSE 824.4 9,991
TRUE FALSE 1,468.8 984
FALSE TRUE 861.6 13,359
TRUE TRUE 905.6 1,106
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Table 1.13: Regression of policy and geographic overlap on investment size decision
DV: decision size (Chinese RMB)
(1) (2) (3)
Guarantee policy (true) 37.2 −10.4 1.9
(40.8) (42.1) (42.1)
Geo. overlap (true) 644.4∗∗∗ 616.5∗∗∗ 440.4∗∗∗
(103.0) (102.5) (101.2)
Geo. overlap * policy −600.4∗∗∗ −623.5∗∗∗ −484.6∗∗∗
(141.1) (140.4) (138.7)
Loan int. rate 42.2∗∗∗ 36.8∗∗∗
(12.0) (11.9)
Loan term 15.4∗∗∗ 16.9∗∗∗
(5.9) (5.9)
Loan size 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 824.4∗∗∗ 856.0∗ 907.8∗∗
(30.8) (437.9) (440.7)
Controls for credit rating No Yes Yes
Lender’s work province No No Yes
Observations 25,440 25,440 24,322
R2 0.002 0.01 0.03
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.01 0.02
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Lenders without geographic informa-
tion counted as no overlap.
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Table 1.14: More fully specified model regressing policy and demographics on in-
vestment size decision
DV: decision size (Chinese RMB)
(1) (2)
Guarantee policy (true) 6.5 11.2
(65.9) (65.6)
Borrower sex (female) 205.5∗∗ 226.2∗∗
(90.4) (88.5)
Borrower sex * policy −346.1∗∗ −402.2∗∗∗
(144.3) (144.1)
Geographic overlap (true) 630.3∗∗∗ 439.7∗∗∗
(105.9) (104.7)
Geo. overlap * policy −656.9∗∗∗ −498.9∗∗∗
(143.8) (142.2)
Loan interest rate 36.9∗∗ 32.9∗∗
(15.0) (14.9)
Loan term 5.8 5.9
(7.6) (7.5)
Loan size 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1, 288.7 1, 505.9
(1, 064.7) (1, 048.3)
Controls for credit rating Yes Yes
Borrower characteristics† Yes Yes
Borrower work province Yes Yes
Lender work province No Yes
Observations 24,212 23,108
R2 0.02 0.03
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.02
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
†In addition to gender, borrower character-
istics include level of academic degree, age,
loan purpose, salary range, office character-
istics (type, size, and industry), and the ex-
istence of a car, house, or children.
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Table 1.15: More fully specified model regressing 30 days prior placebo policy and
demographics on investment size decision
DV: decision size (Chinese RMB)
(1) (2) (3)
Placebo policy (true) −209.9∗∗∗ −230.6∗∗∗ −196.4∗∗∗
(57.4) (65.7) (65.6)
Borrower sex (female) 4.5 −26.8 −15.8
(114.0) (134.2) (133.6)
Borrower sex * policy 64.1 94.4 100.7
(139.1) (159.7) (158.9)
Geographic overlap (true) 163.8 41.7
(128.4) (128.9)
Geo. overlap * placebo policy 427.9∗∗ 372.9∗∗
(168.0) (168.0)
Loan interest rate 25.9∗ 26.9∗ 23.2
(14.3) (16.2) (16.2)
Loan term 9.5 11.7 13.7∗
(7.4) (8.1) (8.1)
Loan size 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 382.3 853.1 976.6
(490.5) (1, 083.8) (1, 079.5)
Controls for credit rating Yes Yes Yes
Borrower characteristics† Yes Yes Yes
Borrower work province No Yes Yes
Lender work province No No Yes
Observations 17,432 16,908 16,866
R2 0.03 0.03 0.04
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.04
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
†In addition to gender, borrower character-
istics include level of academic degree, age,
loan purpose, salary range, office character-
istics (type, size, and industry), and the ex-
istence of a car, house, or children.
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Table 1.16: More fully specified model regressing 30 days after placebo policy and
demographics on investment size decision
DV: decision size (Chinese RMB)
(1) (2) (3)
Placebo policy (true) −210.1∗∗∗ −227.9∗∗∗ −209.6∗∗∗
(35.0) (41.1) (44.4)
Borrower sex (female) −173.6∗∗ −195.7∗∗ −205.2∗∗
(72.0) (83.4) (88.9)
Borrower sex * policy 155.2∗ 152.9 175.8
(90.5) (101.4) (109.4)
Geographic overlap (true) 27.5 14.2
(82.3) (85.8)
Geo. overlap * placebo policy 75.6 49.3
(109.3) (113.4)
Loan interest rate 40.9∗∗∗ 43.2∗∗∗ 39.2∗∗∗
(12.0) (13.3) (14.3)
Loan term 5.0 5.1 8.5
(5.9) (7.0) (7.5)
Loan size 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 375.9 477.6 632.3
(601.4) (643.2) (677.2)
Controls for credit rating Yes Yes Yes
Borrower characteristics† Yes Yes Yes
Borrower work province No Yes Yes
Lender work province No No Yes
Observations 35,576 34,548 30,037
R2 0.01 0.01 0.02
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.02
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
†In addition to gender, borrower character-
istics include level of academic degree, age,
loan purpose, salary range, office character-
istics (type, size, and industry), and the ex-
istence of a car, house, or children.
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Table 1.17: Comparison of HR and non-HR rated loans in a more fully specified
model regressing policy and demographics on investment size decision
DV: decision size (Chinese RMB)
Non-HR HR only Non-HR HR only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Guarantee policy (true) 27.8 13.7 52.3 6.5
(77.1) (289.1) (78.0) (257.6)
Borrower sex (female) 61.7 367.6 88.1 381.4
(105.3) (280.7) (104.7) (248.7)
Borrower sex * policy −369.6∗∗ −239.9 −484.3∗∗∗ −266.3
(182.9) (426.2) (186.2) (380.2)
Geographic overlap (true) 698.8∗∗∗ 194.6 517.4∗∗∗ −18.1
(114.4) (287.8) (114.8) (257.1)
Geo. overlap * policy −724.5∗∗∗ −216.4 −592.9∗∗∗ 105.0
(157.0) (367.9) (157.5) (330.8)
Loan interest rate 51.8∗∗∗ −14.1 44.5∗∗ −20.9
(19.8) (38.5) (20.1) (34.1)
Loan term 1.1 5.1 2.0 7.2
(8.5) (31.2) (8.5) (27.9)
Loan size 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Constant 1,400.4∗∗ −106.2 1,355.4∗∗ 414.6
(621.9) (1,750.2) (631.8) (1,571.3)
Controls for credit rating Yes No Yes No
Borrower characteristics† Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower work province Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender work province No No Yes Yes
Observations 20,644 3,568 19,713 3,395
R2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.004 0.02 0.02
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
†In addition to gender, borrower character-
istics include level of academic degree, age,
loan purpose, salary range, office character-
istics (type, size, and industry), and the ex-
istence of a car, house, or children.
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Table 1.18: Summary of decision counts at the lender level for the sample used for
gender regressions with lender fixed effects. To be included in the sample, a lender
must make at least one loan to a man and one to a woman in both periods; 405
lenders meet this criteria.
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Decisions to women, pre-policy 2.9 2.3 1 16
Decisions to women, post-policy 2.3 2.0 1 16
Decisions to men, pre-policy 11.5 11.5 1 83
Decisions to men, post-policy 12.7 11.6 1 96
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Table 1.19: Lender fixed effects OLS regression of loan policy and gender on invest-
ment size decision
DV: decision size (Chinese RMB)
(1) (2)
Guarantee policy (true) −50.4 41.4
(69.9) (64.5)
Borrower sex (female) 121.7 210.8∗∗
(110.1) (96.9)
Borrower sex * policy −169.7 −202.8
(162.6) (143.0)
Loan interest rate 33.5∗ 34.6∗∗
(17.9) (17.0)
Loan term 20.7∗∗ −2.8
(9.1) (8.5)




Controls for credit rating Yes Yes
Lender fixed effects No Yes
Observations 11,874 11,874
R2 0.02 0.3
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.3
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
71
Table 1.20: Summary of decision counts at the lender level for the sample used for
geography regressions with lender fixed effects. To be included in the sample, a
lender must make at least one loan to a borrower in the same province and one loan
to a borrower in a different province in both periods; 219 lenders meet this criteria.
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Decisions to same province, pre-policy 2.5 2.4 1 18
Decisions to same province, post-policy 2.2 2.2 1 18
Decisions to other province, pre-policy 14.1 13.9 1 84
Decisions to other province, post-policy 14.1 12.5 1 91
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Table 1.21: Lender fixed effects OLS regression of policy and geographic overlap on
investment size decision
DV: decision size (Chinese RMB)
(1) (2)
Guarantee policy (true) −68.2 47.7
(105.0) (96.5)
Geo. overlap (true) 177.3 94.1
(185.9) (163.4)
Geo. overlap * policy −410.4 −242.9
(268.5) (235.2)
Loan int. rate 37.0 52.0∗∗
(26.8) (25.4)
Loan term 35.8∗∗ −12.6
(14.1) (13.0)
Loan size 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 988.6 688.2
(1, 016.7) (1, 036.0)
Controls for credit rating Yes Yes
Lender fixed effects No Yes
Observations 7,190 7,190
R2 0.03 0.3
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.3
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Lenders without geographic informa-
tion counted as no overlap.
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Table 1.22: Tests for sample heterogeneity: more fully specified model regressing
policy and demographics on investment size decision for loans equal to or larger
than 20000 RMB and decisions equal to or greater than 100 RMB.
DV: decision size (Chinese RMB)
(1) (2) (3)
Guarantee policy (true) −163.7 −53.2 −79.4
(103.2) (122.8) (122.7)
Borrower sex (female) 198.0 233.1 258.4∗
(140.1) (156.3) (153.5)
Borrower sex * policy −392.7∗ −482.9∗ −549.9∗∗
(207.1) (265.5) (265.7)
Geographic overlap (true) 989.8∗∗∗ 708.5∗∗∗
(167.6) (166.2)
Geo. overlap * policy −1, 062.2∗∗∗ −801.2∗∗∗
(216.4) (214.2)
Loan interest rate 138.4∗∗∗ 149.5∗∗∗ 168.8∗∗∗
(40.5) (48.1) (48.1)
Loan term −5.7 −10.2 −7.2
(15.8) (18.5) (18.5)
Loan size 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 2, 442.2∗∗ 2, 844.6 3, 351.9∗
(1, 245.2) (1, 808.0) (1, 806.3)
Controls for credit rating Yes Yes Yes
Borrower characteristics† Yes Yes Yes
Borrower work province No Yes Yes
Lender work province No No Yes
Observations 15,992 15,822 15,024
R2 0.01 0.02 0.03
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.03
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
†In addition to gender, borrower character-
istics include level of academic degree, age,
loan purpose, salary range, office character-
istics (type, size, and industry), and the ex-
istence of a car, house, or children.
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Chapter 2: Heterogeneous Motives in Lending Markets: the Influ-
ence of Market Identity
2.1 Introduction
Producers in a market face performance implications based on their adher-
ence to established market categories (Zuckerman, 1999). However, the different
audiences that evaluate these producers are unlikely to value the same categories
at exactly the same levels (Pontikes, 2012).18 Category performance is therefore a
function of audience preferences. Most studies, however, do not directly measure
audience preferences and instead rely on decision-level data that may or may not ac-
curately represent underlying motives. How important are motives to understanding
market behavior, and where might these motives come from?
This paper argues that audience motives are largely endogenous to a given
market. A market’s identity attracts participants with specific preferences, and
these actors then behave in a manner consistent with the market’s identity. While
variance in motives is most likely greatest between audiences in separate markets, it
may also exist within a single market. Markets with so-called “hybrid identities” may
be at greatest risk in this regard. This study examines one such market, where the
18This is true for products as well. In the extreme, “one man’s trash is another man’s treasure.”
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audience (lenders) evaluates candidates (borrowers) in a market that was explicitly
designed to promote both economic and social goals.
In general, social entrepreneurs are characterized by a need to “simultaneously
demonstrate their social and economic competence” (Dacin et al., 2011, p. 1207).
This hybrid identity presents a puzzle for fundraising efforts. Emphasizing the
“business” side of an enterprise will attract traditional investors, emphasizing the
“social” side of an enterprise will attract social investors, but emphasizing both
elements simultaneously has more ambiguous performance implications. I exam-
ine funding decisions in a single market—Kiva, a charitable lending microfinance
organization—to inductively theorize about this nexus between organizational iden-
tity and investor preferences.
A social enterprise is a type of hybrid-identity organization—an organization
“whose identity is composed of two or more types that would not normally be ex-
pected to go together” (Albert and Whetten, 1985, p. 270). A subset of research
on organizational identity addresses the relationship between stakeholders and or-
ganizational identity (e.g., Brickson, 2005; Scott and Lane, 2000). However, devel-
opment of an empirical understanding of the functioning of such organizations has
often proved challenging (e.g., Foreman and Whetten, 2002).
The Kiva empirical context draws on strong themes from both charity and
business activity. I propose that lender motives mirror the market identity, so
that individual lenders evaluate entrepreneurs based on two underlying dimensions:
perceived economic ability (corresponding to the market’s business identity) and
perceived personal need (corresponding to its charity identity). This study is de-
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signed to measure distributions of these motives and the subsequent performance
implications for entrepreneurs.
I extend Albert and Whetten’s original conception of holographic and ideo-
graphic forms of internal organizational duality to external stakeholders and test
which of these forms is present in the non-profit peer-to-peer lending website ex-
amined in this study. A theory of the relationship between external stakeholder
identification and organizational identity is developed. Interpreted within the bur-
geoning scholarship on social entrepreneurship, this work may contribute insights
about how such contexts differ from conventional markets.
Results from an original survey indicate that lender motives are indeed con-
sistent with the market’s identity and are moderately dominated by a preference
for perceived need. These preferences are also correlated with lender demograph-
ics. Further, variance in preferences matters for borrowers on the platform. Loans
made by lenders with a high preference for both of the dimensions were funded
fastest, while loans made by lenders with a low preference for these categories were
funded slowest. The importance of these categories appears to decrease over time
as the market matures, which may be an indication of a shift from an ideographic
to a holographic configuration. These results contribute to an understanding of
the role of external stakeholders in the maintenance and support of hybrid-identity
organizations. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: 1) theoretical
discussion of hybrid-identity organizations, 2) introduction to the empirical setting,
3) methods, and 4) results.
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2.2 Theory
The concept of a hybrid-identity organization was first popularized by Albert
and Whetten (1985, p. 270), who defined it as “an organization whose identity is
composed of two or more types that would not normally be expected to go together.”
The organizational example they proposed was the university. Universities employ
both utilitarian and normative constructs that are exemplified in business-like and
church-like behavior. Therefore, a university can be conceptualized in terms of its
two components, each of which contributes to its overall functioning. Additional
studies have highlighted that hybrid organizations can be found in many sectors of
the economy, such as rural co-ops (Foreman and Whetten, 2002), law firms, and
beverage producers (Brickson, 2005).
Included in the original discussion of hybrid-identity organizations was a pro-
posal for two potential structural forms of duality within an organization: holo-
graphic and ideographic. Holographic refers to an organization where “each internal
unit exhibits the properties of the organization as a whole,” and ideographic (or spe-
cialized) refers to the case where “each internal unit exhibits only one identity—the
multiple identities of the organization being represented by different units” (Albert
and Whetten, 1985, p. 271). Universities, for example, are structurally divided
between faculty and administrators who support the organization’s normative and
utilitarian functions, respectively.
I propose that the holographic and ideographic concepts originally developed
for internal organizational arrangements may also exist for external stakeholders
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such as customers and investors. In a holographic arrangement, these stakeholders
may all identify with the single hybrid identity of the organization. In the ideo-
graphic arrangement, separate subsets of stakeholders may identify with one or the
other element of the organization’s identity. Therefore, the organization may main-
tain its hybrid-identity as a result of either multiple types of stakeholders or one
single type. These configurations are summarized in Figure 2.1.
Implicit in this discussion is the fact that organizational identity is the result
of both managers and stakeholders. As Scott and Lane (2000, p. 44) argue, “orga-
nizational identity is best understood as contested and negotiated through iterative
interactions between mangers and stakeholders.” The organizational founder, there-
fore, sets an initial identity for the organization at its time of conception. Potential
stakeholders then respond to this identity by deciding whether and in what capacity
to interact with the organization. If there is a discrepancy between how the organi-
zation sees itself and how stakeholders conceive of it, the organization may be forced
to update its identity to satisfy stakeholder conceptions. This process is ongoing
over the life of the organization. Stakeholder configurations may be distinct in both
theory and practice from internal forms of organizational duality. For example, a
hybrid organization could be internally heterogeneous (i.e., ideographic), but attract
homogeneous stakeholders (i.e., holographic). Or the hybrid organization could be
homogeneous in its internal units (i.e., holographic) but attract discrete sets of
stakeholders (i.e., ideographic) which separately identify with different elements of
its hybrid identity.
A number of implications regarding the long-term sustainability of an orga-
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nization can be conjectured given this theoretical relationship between stakeholder
forms and organizational unit forms. It is conceivable that the (in)stability of orga-
nizational forms is fundamentally linked to how external stakeholders identify with
the organization. The four potential configurations of internal unit and external
stakeholder configurations are explored in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 along with conjectures
regarding the potential consequences for the organization. While these cannot be
directly tested in this paper, they will help frame the discussion of empirical results.
2.2.1 The empirical setting
Brickson (2005, p. 582) notes that, “though some preliminary antecedents of
hybrids have been offered, little empirical work addresses them.” Kiva represents an
ideal setting to study a hybrid market comprised of actors with potentially hetero-
geneous motives. The wealth of empirical data generated by the Kiva context also
addresses the growing interest in organizational research on sustainable industries
such as microfinance (Khavul, 2010).
Kiva is self-described as “a non-profit organization with a mission to con-
nect people through lending to alleviate poverty.”19 Kiva acts as an intermediary
between individual lenders typically in higher-income economies and microfinance
institutions (MFIs) typically in lower-income economies that directly distribute and
manage the loans of individual entrepreneurs. Kiva manages its public website,
19Quote accessed June 16, 2015 at the Kiva “About” webpage (http://www.kiva.org/about).
Kiva held a very similar mission statement for most of its history. Historical versions were accessed
at the Internet Archive [link]. Hyperlinks are included in the PDF version:
May 14, 2008 [link]: “Kiva’s mission is to connect people through lending for the sake of allevi-
ating poverty.”
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Kiva.org, where it posts individual borrower profiles provided by the MFIs. Anyone
from the public can register for a Kiva account and then loan money to specific
borrowers. Fundraising is performed in a piecemeal fashion ($25 increments); a
borrower’s public loan page states the total amount of funds requested and the
amount of money currently raised from other individual lenders. Once the aggre-
gate contributions from lenders equal the entrepreneur’s requested amount, the loan
is considered fully funded and removed from the Kiva website. Loan repayment oc-
curs on a predetermined schedule. However, Kiva lenders never receive interest on
their loans. While there is no potential for profits, lenders do incur some economic
risk.20
Early in the organization’s history, Kiva co-founder Matt Flannery detailed
five elements of Kiva’s product philosophy. Included in his list was “Emphasize
Progress Over Poverty” (Flannery, 2007, p. 40). In Flannery’s conception, “Busi-
ness is a universal language that can appeal to people of almost every background.
This can lead to partnerships rather than benefactor relationships. We appeal to
people’s interests, not their compassion.” The idea that people could be open to lend-
ing money as a charitable act is now well supported by the growth of the broader
microfinance movement (Khavul, 2010). However, the phenomena of charity and
lending are not obviously related on a theoretical level: the act of lending is cen-
trally concerned with the economically productive use of capital within a market,
while charity is focused on helping others through benevolent actions—often ad-
20For a discussion of economic risk at different levels of the Kiva system (borrower, field partner,
country), see: http://www.kiva.org/about/risk
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dressing a perceived market failure. One way to interpret the enormous popularity
of Muhammad Yunus—founder of Grameen Bank and often considered the “father of
microfinance”—is that the concept of applying market-based business principles to
poverty alleviation problems was so novel and innovative as to warrant the awarding
of a Nobel Peace Prize—surely the first for a financial innovation. Studies such as
Battilana and Dorado (2010) have explicitly examined how this hybrid tension plays
out within commercial microfinance organizations (see also Kent and Dacin (2013)
for an analysis of the two dominant logics in the broader microfinance industry).
The above quote from Flannery, however, compliments and contrasts with
Kiva’s objective status as a 501(c)(3) non-profit and its mission “to connect people
through lending to alleviate poverty.” The fact that lenders are never paid interest
on their loans results in a de facto selection bias of lenders to the Kiva platform,
as participants have an ex-ante understanding that the purpose of their lending is
not to make a profit. At the same time, lenders likely do expect their loans to
be repaid (historical repayment rates are around 98%) and explicitly choose to use
Kiva instead of more traditional charity outlets that would allow them to conduct
outright donations. Critical to this research approach is the acknowledgement that
stakeholders deliberately self select into relations with particular organizations such
as Kiva. Therefore, lenders are drawn to the Kiva platform at least in part by its
ability to combine elements of charity and business activity into a single service.
Any empirical observations are a direct result of this latent choice process, even
though I cannot map the entire ecosystem (e.g., the choice set might contain a wide
range of other charities, investment opportunities, etc.). In short, the preferences of
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actors in the market are at least partly endogenous to the market’s identity.
I propose that understanding lender motives is critical on at least two the-
oretical dimensions. First, it represents a clear instantiation of the organization’s
hybrid-identity at the external stakeholder level: if the behavior of lenders is not
consistent with the organization’s identity, the identity would be temporally unsus-
tainable. Therefore, the question becomes how exactly lenders support this iden-
tity. Second, for borrowers and market managers, understanding the distribution
of lender motives may shape how they choose to position themselves within the
market.
A handful of recent studies have also employed Kiva as a research context.
A number of these studies corroborate Flannery’s observations. Some have demon-
strated that the language used in loan descriptions influences fundraising perfor-
mance (Allison et al., 2013, 2015; Moss et al., 2015). Others have demonstrated
a homophily effect between lenders and borrowers (Burtch et al., 2014; Desai and
Kharas, 2013; Galak et al., 2011). These studies provide strong evidence that Kiva
is a unique context where lenders may be expected to reward borrower characteris-
tics in ways that differ from both for-profit lending and pure charity. I extend these
studies to the extent that I directly measure lender motives.
2.2.2 Lender preferences
Individual lenders make choices about where to direct their capital, and the
entrepreneurs that best match preferences receive funding faster than others. Sim-
ilar to a traditional lending setting, there is evidence that choices are nonrandom.
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However, unlike banking or venture capital settings, the market identity is expected
to attract different types of lenders. Matt Flannery, the co-founder, commented
on this relatively soon after Kiva’s founding: “Lenders showed unambiguous pref-
erences according to region, gender, and business type: Africans first, women first,
and agriculture first. A female African fruit seller? Funded in hours. Nicaraguan
retail stand? Funded in days. A Bulgarian Taxi Driver? Funded in weeks” (Flan-
nery, 2007, p. 50). But where did these preferences come from? The question of
whether this hybrid logic takes the structure of a homogeneous adoption across
lenders (i.e., holographic: all lenders have the same hybrid preference) or a het-
erogeneous combination of business and charity logics (i.e., ideographic: subsets of
lenders have different preferences and are motivated by different elements of Kiva)
is an empirical one that has yet to be fully explored in the literature on dual identity
organizations.
Because lenders self-select into Kiva usage—and have ex-ante awareness of
Kiva’s identity—the framework for thinking about Kiva’s hybridity can be extended
to lender motives for lending. These motives ultimately influence a lender’s lending
decisions. This is similar to the importance of members’ identification with multiple-
identity organizations (Foreman and Whetten, 2002). Therefore, the organizational
identity of Kiva shapes both the attraction and subsequent behavior of stakeholders.
Average lender preference for each dimension of the market identity should therefore
be high.
In the case of Kiva, I suggest that lenders classify borrowers along two specific
dimensions that correlate with the platform’s charity-like and business-like identity:
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the borrower’s perceived level of personal need and perceived level of economic abil-
ity. If true, lenders will rate these dimensions as independently important. However,
this alone does not provide insight into the configuration of preferences.
The two potential forms of lender configurations were depicted earlier in Figure
2.1. In the holographic scenario, all lenders directly employ a hybrid preference for
borrower need and ability. In the ideographic scenario, two subsets of lenders each
employ separate preferences that then on average combine to produce the observed
hybrid identity. The configuration of the market can therefore be revealed by asking
lenders to choose between the separate dimensions. If there is a preference for each
category independently, but no preference between the two categories, then the
market is more holographic than ideographic.
This may be important because if subgroups of stakeholders prefer different
aspects of the identity, then the hybrid organization may benefit from strategically
promoting the stability of that distribution. If not, the organization’s identity may
be challenged. If all stakeholders employ a single hybrid preference, however, the
organization’s hybrid identity may be at less risk of external challenges. Because
lenders are external stakeholders instead of internal units, these predictions are
theoretically distinct from those made by Albert and Whetten (1985) regarding
potential consequences of each of the two internal forms.
2.2.3 The impact of lender preferences on borrowers
The variance in the preference for perceived economic ability and personal
need of borrowers should shape lenders’ choices. Loans that most closely satisfy
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each lender preference will be funded fastest. The more a borrower appears to be in
personal need, the more clearly he or she will satisfy a lender’s charity motive. The
more a borrower appears to have economic ability, the more likely he or she will
satisfy the business motive. A continuum is proposed for each category, because
“category members fall within fuzzy boundaries, so it is not always clear which
instances belong in that category” (Fiske and Taylor, 2008, p. 94).
From the above discussion, two hypotheses are proposed regarding an individ-
ual loan’s performance given how closely it matches the motives of lenders.
Hypothesis 1: Loans made by lenders with a high pref-
erence for economic ability will be funded
faster than loans made by lenders with a
low preference for economic ability.
Hypothesis 2: Loans made by lenders with a high prefer-
ence for personal need will be funded faster
than loans made by lenders with a low pref-
erence for personal need.
The optimal configuration is for a borrower to appear to have high personal
need and high economic ability. The least optimal configuration for a borrower is
to communicate low personal need and low economic ability. Table 2.3 summarizes
the main hypotheses regarding speed of funding in relation to each combination of
these categories.
The previous hypotheses relate to the aggregated performance of individual
loans. However, there may be temporal implications of category membership. It is
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possible that the importance of separate categories may dissipate over time as what
once once a novel combination slowly becomes more accepted.
Hypothesis 3: The performance differential between the
ability and need categories will converge
over time as the market matures.
2.3 Methodology
The challenge of indirectly inferring motives from decision-level data is that
actors may make the same decisions for a multitude of reasons. Any attempt by a
researcher to assign borrower characteristics to categories would thus involve a high
degree of subjectivity. For example, if a lender preference for female borrowers is
observed, it might be that lenders believe women to have greater ability or greater
need. Both are plausible interpretations from the microfinance literature (Roodman,
2012).
To resolve this issue, I survey a subset of actual Kiva lenders on their motives
for lending and then compare this to their loan portfolios. First, a random sample
of lenders is directly surveyed on the importance of the two categories previously
outlined. Each respondent’s survey data is then matched to the loans in his or her
historical portfolio. This portfolio is comprised of each loan to which the lender has
lent using Kiva. These data are then used to calculate borrower-level performance
effects of appealing to different lender motives.
This approach has a number of limitations. First, because it is guided by
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apriori theory, it does not allow for the emergence of other motives. For example,
prior research has identified a range of overall motives for lending on Kiva, some
related to this framework and some not (Liu et al., 2012). The result is that this
process will not be able to exhaustively explain lender motives. However, it is
efficient for testing the link between market identity, motives, and loan category
performance, which is the focus of this paper.
2.4 Data
The primary loan and lending decision data were collated from the public
data set provided by the company. To my knowledge, this consists of data on every
loan from Kiva’s founding until February 9th, 2015, as well as all public lenders and
lending decisions.21 I designed a separate survey to determine the motives of lenders
along the two theoretical dimensions discussed above. These two data sources were
then matched when possible. I next present descriptive statistics on each of these
data sources.
2.4.1 The full population of Kiva data
2.4.1.1 Lenders
The platform had 1,599,750 registered users, of which 1,023,885 had made at
least one publicly visible loan. These lenders have made in total 16,018,887 lending
decisions, an average of 16 loans per active user. An individual historical lending
21The majority of lending on the platform is public, though a lender can choose to lend anony-
mously if they wish. If a lender lends anonymously I would not be able to see the activity.
88
portfolio can be constructed for each lender based on these data. While complete
statistics on the location of lenders are not available, the majority of those that
self-report say that they are from the United States (65%).
2.4.1.2 Borrowers
A total of 835,330 individual loans had been posted on the platform for
fundraising since its founding. These loans were administered by 381 different field
partners. Figure 2.2 plots the growth in the number of new loans posted across
the history of the platform, and Figure 2.3 plots the cumulative dollar sum lent,
which is now in excess of $600 million. Because Kiva screens new loans and actively
manages relationships with field partners, it has some degree of control over the
supply of loans. During this growth, loan supply and demand appear to be fairly
well matched, though the supply to demand ratio has increased slightly in recent
years. Figure 2.4 shows the current status of every loan request in the platform’s
history. The vast majority of loans were successfully paid off or (for recent loans)
are currently in repayment. Nearly every loan request was successfully funded until
2012, when about five percent of loan requests expired.22 The default rate incurred
by lenders has remained in the very low single digits.
Table 2.4 details loan-level statistics. The average loan has a 13 month repay-
ment term and requested $841. About 74% of borrowers are women. About 14%
of loans are “group loans,” meaning the loan will be divided between a collection of





Loans are requested for a variety of purposes and are categorized by use into
sectors and further subdivided into more granular activities. Table 2.5 details the
distribution of loans across the 15 sectors (food-related business is the most fre-
quent), and Table 2.6 shows the distribution by popular sub-activities (retail general
store is the most frequent). Table 2.7 lists the most prevalent countries in terms
of number of loan requests. There is no dominant world region; the three most
frequent countries are the Philippines, Kenya, and Peru.
2.4.2 The survey
2.4.2.1 Design of the survey
A brief online survey was designed to directly solicit lending motives from
actual Kiva lenders. The primary question used for this study consisted of, “When
you personally choose a borrower to lend to using Kiva...”, 1) “...how important is
it to you that the borrower has the potential to be economically productive with a
loan? (for example, it appears a loan would allow the borrower to make significant
economic profits)” and 2) “...how important is it to you that the borrower appears to
have a strong personal need for a loan? (for example, it appears that a loan would
significantly improve the borrower’s life)” Each of these two questions was followed
with a nine point Likert scale ranging from “Not at all important” to “Extremely
important.”23
23These questions were presented in a randomized order on the same page. Each of the following
questions—or set of questions—were presented on independent pages.
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To account for respondents that may have ranked the two similarly, the subse-
quent question asked for the dominant preference: “Thinking back on the loans you
have already made using Kiva, which of the following was more important to you?”
1) “that the borrower appeared to have economic ability” or 2) “that the borrower
appeared to have personal need”. It is possible that a lender might diversify his or
her portfolio across these dimensions, so a followup question was designed to under-
stand how consistent this preference had been: “Did you always prefer a borrower
with [personal need / economic ability] over a borrower with [economic ability /
personal need]?” “Yes, always,” “Yes, mostly,” or “No.” If “No,” “Please explain
how your decision changed across loans.” A final question about organizational sim-
ilarity to a bank and to a charity was also included, as well as fields for respondent
gender, country location, estimated number of loans made, and lender ID.
2.4.2.2 Description of survey data
A link to the online survey was distributed by Kiva via email to 10,000 active
users on March 11, 2015 and was open for one month.24 The recruitment emails
were sent by Kiva, and I ran the survey independently through the Qualtrics survey
platform.25 By completing the survey, respondents were entered into a raffle for
24Kiva randomly selected these 10,000 users from a pool consisting of all users that 1) were
active—had either logged into the website or received a repayment within the prior six months, 2)
had not previously opted out of Kiva email newsletters, and 3) were not part of a previous smaller
pilot survey in this study.
25The same link was distributed to all email addresses, meaning participants could have for-
warded it to others if desired, though they were not explicitly asked to do so. The text of the
recruitment email was as follows:
Subject: Kiva wants to hear from you!
Greetings! The Kiva Research Team has partnered with researchers at the University of Maryland
who are interested in studying the different motivations of Kiva lenders. They’ve put together a
short survey that will take approximately 2 minutes to complete.
91
a $25 Kiva gift card. This resulted in 1,509 completed responses. Figures 2.5,
2.6, and 2.7 present a summary of the raw main results. Table 2.8 shows that the
vast majority of respondents are in the United States. Figure 2.8 indicates that
self-reported past experience of the lenders (number of loans made) is fairly well
distributed and most are female (59%).
909 responses could be successfully matched to lender usernames in the main
Kiva data. The respondents that could not be matched either provided an incorrect
version of their Kiva username or chose to lend anonymously, and therefore their
lending activity is not publicly observable. This process resulted in the creation of a
historical loan portfolio for the survey respondents consisting of all loans to which at
least one respondent had lent. There were two survey respondents that were outliers
in the number of loans they had made (one more than ten thousand loans and one
more than a thousand loans; the next highest was less than four hundred loans).
Therefore, the loans from these two respondents were removed to prevent their loan
portfolios from overwhelming the other respondents in the data. The remaining
respondents’ collective historical loan portfolio consisted of 36,263 unique loans. At
least one lender to each of these loans was a survey respondent.
From the overlaid histogram in Figure 2.2, this portfolio of loans does not
perfectly mirror the distribution of the full population. However, neither is it heavily
skewed toward more recent loans which could be a risk of running the survey at only
one point in time. Figure 2.9 also indicates that the respondents fairly closely match
Click here to learn more about the project and to take the survey on the University of Maryland’s
site.
Thanks so much!
The Kiva Research Team
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the full lender population in terms of when they first began using Kiva. It therefore
appears that the survey respondents are a fairly good representation of Kiva lenders.
The relevant survey responses were next assigned to each of these 36,263 loans.
If multiple survey respondents lent to the same loan, then the survey responses were
averaged for that loan (approximately 6.5% of these loans were invested in by more
than one respondent).
Two categorical variables were then created for each loan. The first leverages
the individual Likert scale responses regarding the importance of economic ability
and personal need. High need and high ability are defined as having above average
need and ability scores, respectively. This average value is calculated from the full
completed survey respondent pool, as opposed to the loan pool or only respondents
that were matched to loans. Each loan falls into one of the four combinations of
these variables: high-high, high-low, low-high, and low-low.
For the second variable, loan category, each loan was assigned to one of three
categories: need, ability, or mixed. I do this by leveraging the survey question
that forced a preference between need and ability (see Figure 2.6). If a respondent
subsequently answered that they always or mostly held that preference, then the
loan is assigned to that category. If the respondent replied that they did not always
hold the preference, then it is assigned to a “mixed” category. If two lenders shared
a loan in their portfolios, but had different answers to the preference question, it
was also assigned to the mixed category.
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2.4.3 Outcome variables
The main outcome variables are the lender preferences measured in the survey.
Analyses of their distributions will provide the primary insight into the configuration
of market preferences. The impact of these preferences on borrowers is measured by
comparing these surveyed preferences with the characteristics of the loans actually
made by survey respondents.
The primary borrower variable is the amount of time required for a successful
loan to be fully funded. This is calculated as the time between when a loan was
posted on the website for funding and the time the loan was fully funded. The
average funded loan required 143 hours to reach the requested amount, with a
median of 31 hours. Figure 2.10 plots this variable across the history of the platform.
The value has been steadily increasing which supports the interpretation that the
supply has increased slightly faster than demand. The prior tables (Tables 2.5, 2.6,
and 2.7) also include average times required to fulfill loan requests by categories, and
it is clear that the speed at which loans are funded varies significantly depending
on the attributes of the borrower.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Lender preferences
The main survey results in Figure 2.5 indicate the majority of respondents
believed both ability and need to be independently important. The average score
94
on the 1–9 scale for economic ability was 6.6 and for personal need was 7.4. The high
preferences for each of these categories indicate that motives do parallel the broader
market identity. Figure 2.6 shows that one of the two categories was typically more
important than the other to most respondents, indicating an ideographic distribution
of motives: 35% always or mostly preferred economic ability, 42% always or mostly
preferred personal need, and 23% did not have a consistent preference between the
two.
These preferences also appear correlated with respondent demographics. Ta-
bles 2.9 and 2.10 detail the gender and geographic differences between respondents
with preferences for different categories of respondents. Tests of statistical signifi-
cance between the categories were performed with either pairwise comparisons using
Tukey’s method for continuous variables (e.g., fund time) or pairwise comparisons
of proportions with Holm corrections for binary variables (e.g., gender). The per-
centage of female respondents was significantly higher for need than ability (63%
versus 53%). This difference was largest between high ability/low need respondents
(48% female) and low ability/high need respondents (65% female). A preference for
higher ability borrowers appears more common in the United States than in other
countries. For example, only 52% of the low ability/high need respondents were
from the United States, compared to 62% of the high ability/low need category and
66% of the high ability/high need. However this geographic distinction was not
statistically significant for the ability, need, and mixed categories.
The above statistics are also tabulated in Table 2.11 for the subsample of
respondents that were matched to lending data. Two additional statistics can be
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calculated on this sample: the number of loans made and the average date that a
lender joined Kiva. These values do not appear to significantly vary by category, as
the average join date is very similar and the number of loans made is not statistically
distinguishable.
2.5.2 The impact of lender preferences on borrowers
Table 2.12 summarizes the characteristics of the borrowers in each of the cat-
egories. “Mixed” is funded slower than need and ability and are larger loans on
average. The percentage of female borrowers is slightly higher for need (73%) than
ability (71%) and mixed (69%)—compared to a population average of 71%.
To test the loan performance hypotheses, I leverage the independent ability
and need ratings in conjunction with the time required for a loan to be funded.
Table 2.13 presents this two-by-two using the separate scores, and shows that loans
rated both high on ability and high on need were funded the fastest (requiring 88%
of average time of a low/low loan). Low/low was the slowest, with low/high and
high/low in between. These results support hypotheses 1 and 2 which predicted
that loans that demonstrate more need and ability would be funded faster.
To test Hypothesis 3—whether these performance effects dissipate as the mar-
ket matures—I plot the performance by category over time. Figures 2.11 and 2.12
plot this relationship. It does appear that the performance differential between
categories is smaller for more recent loans, lending support to Hypothesis 3.
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2.6 Discussion and conclusion
This study begins to explore a number of questions regarding the relationship
between organizational identity, external stakeholders, and organizations. It does
so in the context of the emerging charitable microfinance industry. The findings
indicate that lenders appear to participate in the market using motives consistent
with both charity and business contexts. This is important for borrowers to the
extent that it influences their funding performance.
This research contributes to the hybrid-identity literature by beginning to
untangle the potentially unique role of stakeholders in such organizations. The Kiva
market represents a kind of “bridging institutional entrepreneurship” (Tracey et
al., 2011), where the market is a novel combination of two separate forms. This
study therefore provides evidence for the micro-foundation of such markets, and the
methodology may apply to other cases of novel institutions.
It also contributes to the emerging research on prosocial lending (Allison et al.,
2013, 2015; Burtch et al., 2014; Galak et al., 2011; Moss et al., 2015). As the broader
crowdfunding industry continues to develop it is likely that new forms of yet-to-be-
imagined platforms will be created. This research may help provide insight into
what that process might look like by providing individual-level behavioral analysis
of why people participate.
There are a number of limitations to the study. First, it does not measure orga-
nizational identity change. Therefore, any conclusions about how stakeholders may
influence organizational identity over the long run cannot be empirically explored.
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Second, the survey may suffer from retrospective bias. The survey was worded to
avoid this, but it is nevertheless possible that lenders were unable to accurately
recount their historical motives for lending. Third, the Kiva context may generalize
well to settings where the relationship between the organization and the external
stakeholders is comprised of discrete interactions (e.g., consumer products, other in-
vesting contexts). However, other relationships between external stakeholders and
organizations may be significantly more complex. Therefore, the frameworks pre-
sented in this paper may serve as a starting point for thinking about future research
in such contexts.
Finally, traditional streams of management research such as the Resource-
based View (Barney, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Wernerfelt, 1984) attempt
to define critical firm attributes, but if investors evaluating these attributes have
heterogeneous motives, then it can say little about the performance implications
across settings. Firms that most closely match investor preferences should perform
well in capital acquisition. This may also reshape some theorizing in the categories
literature. For example, any “illegitimacy discount” or legitimacy premium exists
only to the extent that the audience being studied has a preference for specific
categories. As this study highlights, heterogeneity in underlying motives can indeed
influence performance in some markets.
A number of recommendations can potentially be made to practitioners based
on the study’s findings. Organizations that have hybrid identities need to consider
how the stakeholders with which they interact view the organization. In the case of
a financial market like Kiva, the success of borrowers can depend on understanding
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this relationship. Managers of hybrid-identity organizations might be well served
to note not only how their internal units contribute to their organization’s identity,
but also the nature of the relationships that their organization maintain with ex-
ternal stakeholders. As theorized, there may be strategic implications for the firm













Holographic distribution Ideographic distribution
Figure 2.1: The two potential forms of lender preferences: holographic and ideo-
graphic structures of duality. Left: holographic distribution of lender portfolios
where lenders all prefer a mixed category. Right: ideographic distribution where




































































































Figure 2.2: Number of loans posted on the Kiva platform by month. Separate























































Figure 2.4: Stacked bar histogram of the status of every loan on Kiva over time.
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ECONOMIC: When you personally choose a borrower to lend to
using Kiva, how important is it to you that the borrower has the
potential to be economically productive with a loan? (for example,
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PERSONAL: When you personally choose a borrower to lend to
using Kiva, how important is it to you that the borrower appears
to have a strong personal need for a loan? (for example, it appears
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Within individual difference between ECONOMIC and PERSONAL ratings
Figure 2.5: Survey responses regarding preferences for borrower economic produc-
tivity and personal need. Dashed vertical lines are the average responses. Includes


















Thinking back on the loans you have already made using Kiva,


















Did you always prefer a borrower with economic ability



















Did you always prefer a borrower with personal need
over a borrower with economic ability?
Figure 2.6: Survey responses regarding individual loan portfolio diversification pref-
erences. Depending on the answer to the top question, the respondent was asked the
appropriate followup about either need or ability. A followup prompt was requested
if they answered no to these: “If no, please explain how your decision varied across
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Within individual difference between BANK and CHARITY ratings
Figure 2.7: Survey responses regarding perceived similarity of the platform to a
bank and to a charity. Dashed vertical lines are the average responses. Includes
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Approximately how many loans have you made using Kiva?








2006-01 2008-01 2010-01 2012-01 2014-01














0 100 200 300














Figure 2.9: Descriptive statistics of the 909 survey respondents that could be
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Figure 2.11: Changes over time in loan category performance for loans in survey
respondents’ portfolios. The performance appears to converge as the platform ma-







2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014























Figure 2.12: Aggregated changes over time in loan category performance for loans
in survey respondents’ portfolios. Aggregated to year level for clarity. Quadrant
names represent: economic ability, personal need.
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Table 2.1: Organizational implications of the potential forms of duality at the levels










rs Holographic Potential for internal ten-
sion because stakeholder
changes may favor the iden-
tity of one organizational
unit over the other.
No tension, very stable.
Easy to sync organizational
identity to changes in stake-
holder preferences.
Ideographic High tension and organiza-
tional instability. The nat-
ural tendency is for the or-
ganization to split and in-
dividually serve each stake-
holder group.
Organization at risk from
stakeholder tension. Orga-






Table 2.2: Depiction of the four proposed organization-stakeholder configurations.
Top rows: organizational units. Bottom rows: external stakeholders.
Holographic-ideographic configuration:
Hybrid org





Unit A Unit B
Hybrid stakeholders
Ideographic-ideographic configuration:
Unit A Unit B
Stakeholder A Stakeholder B
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Table 2.3: Hypothesized time required to meet funding request given a loan’s levels
of perceived personal need and economic ability.




Table 2.4: Additional borrower descriptive statistics for the full population of loans
mean
Avg. loan request 841.00
Avg. repayment term (months) 12.82
% women 74.37
% group loans 13.88
Avg. number of borrowers in group loans 7.97













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.6: The 25 most prevalent of the 149 loan activity categories. Data represents
every loan request on Kiva.
Activity Sector Count Avg fund time (h)
1 General Store Retail 68373 162.5
2 Farming Agriculture 67568 129.1
3 Retail Retail 51521 181.2
4 Clothing Sales Clothing 40478 182.3
5 Food Production/Sales Food 40376 109.0
6 Agriculture Agriculture 37569 154.6
7 Personal Housing Expenses Housing 31101 274.9
8 Grocery Store Food 28214 161.9
9 Fruits & Vegetables Food 22820 108.6
10 Food Market Food 21555 100.9
11 Pigs Agriculture 19579 81.4
12 Fish Selling Food 15596 95.9
13 Animal Sales Agriculture 14287 160.3
14 Food Stall Food 13249 129.7
15 Livestock Agriculture 12943 178.0
16 Higher education costs Education 12725 89.1
17 Services Services 12267 191.7
18 Sewing Services 11293 97.3
19 Food Food 11069 132.1
20 Motorcycle Transport Transportation 10565 142.9
21 Cattle Agriculture 10180 192.5
22 Tailoring Services 10033 74.9
23 Beauty Salon Services 9694 140.8
24 Poultry Agriculture 9554 89.1
25 Dairy Agriculture 9193 106.7
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Table 2.7: The 25 most prevalent of the 91 countries from where loans are requested.
Data represents every loan request on Kiva.
Country Count % total Avg fund time (h)
1 Philippines 140840 16.9 94.0
2 Kenya 72240 8.6 129.0
3 Peru 69903 8.4 106.5
4 Cambodia 46774 5.6 96.9
5 Nicaragua 35096 4.2 214.6
6 El Salvador 33851 4.1 301.5
7 Uganda 31095 3.7 153.2
8 Tajikistan 26017 3.1 253.1
9 Ecuador 20989 2.5 157.6
10 Pakistan 19784 2.4 149.8
11 Bolivia 18432 2.2 229.3
12 Ghana 18091 2.2 52.0
13 Mexico 14711 1.8 81.2
14 Colombia 14655 1.8 313.8
15 Paraguay 13887 1.7 108.0
16 Vietnam 12309 1.5 96.0
17 Nigeria 11997 1.4 75.4
18 Sierra Leone 11669 1.4 124.7
19 Tanzania 11600 1.4 74.9
20 Rwanda 11237 1.3 104.0
21 Togo 11117 1.3 124.2
22 Honduras 10746 1.3 205.7
23 Lebanon 10458 1.3 294.5
24 Samoa 10032 1.2 120.7
25 Senegal 9902 1.2 157.9
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Table 2.8: The 5 most prevalent of the 51 home countries of the total 1509 survey
respondents. The “matched” column is the number of respondents that could be
matched to loans.
Survey respondent location N Matched
1 United States of America 909 544
2 Canada 173 98
3 Australia 127 78
4 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 67 44
5 Germany 39 27
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Table 2.9: Descriptive statistics for respondent demographic questions, by category.
The only significant differences are between the percentage of women in the “ability”
and “need” categories and the “ability” and “mixed” categories.
category N % female % USA
ability 534 53.0 60.9
need 635 62.8 58.4
mixed 340 61.4 64.1
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Table 2.10: Respondent demographic statistics for each of the low-high ability/need
quadrants. For gender, high ability/low need has statistically fewer women than
every other category. For country, low/high has statistically fewer respondents in
the USA than both of the high ability quadrants, and low/low has statistically fewer
than high/high.
Comparative pref for ability, need N % female % USA
High, low 379 47.7 62.1
High, high 530 63.0 66.7
Low, low 298 60.2 56.6
Low, high 302 65.0 51.8
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Table 2.11: Descriptive statistics for respondent demographic questions by category,
for respondents matched with loan data. Need and ability are significantly different
in the number of female borrowers. The other values are not statistically different.
category N % female % USA # loans made Mean join date
ability 312 51.8 60.2 50.1 2010-10-23
need 392 62.1 57.8 42.6 2010-10-23
mixed 205 58.0 64.7 50.5 2011-01-10
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Table 2.12: Summary statistics for loans in each of the three categories based on
survey responses from Figure 2.6. “Mixed” indicates no consistent preference or
conflicting preferences if two respondents lent to the same loan but disagreed. Com-
parisons of the differences between each mean fund time are significant at a 95%
confidence level. Mixed also have significantly larger loan requests. The differences
in gender and group loans percentages are also significant.
need ability mixed
N 13624 12800 9839
Avg fund time (hours) 238 225 248
Loan request amount 1523 1566 1989
% borrower female 73 71 69
% group loan 22 24 27
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Table 2.13: Average funding times for loans in each of the four quadrants. Pairwise
comparisons of each mean value are significant at a 95% confidence level with the
exception of the difference between “high ability, low need” and each of the low
ability quadrants.




Chapter 3: Social and Financial Motives in Peer-to-peer Lending: an
Online Experiment
3.1 Introduction
Online crowdfunding platforms represent a promising context for controlled
field experiments. This is because the interaction between those seeking funds and
those providing funds is mediated by third-parties: the crowdfunding platforms.
Various permutations of this technology can be randomly tested against each other
at a relatively low cost. To my knowledge, however, few academic studies have em-
ployed the method. One exception is Burtch et al. (2015), which collaborated with
a reward-based platform to experimentally manipulate the presentation of privacy
options and measure changes in the propensity and size of funding decisions.
This study presents another such experiment. The general framework pre-
sented in the introduction to this dissertation highlights the multitude of potential
motives that funders can have for participating in crowdfunding. Motives are im-
portant because they determine the conditions under which a funder—in this case
a lender—is willing to provide money. For example, a lender with high external
motives might lend even if there is no expectation of financial returns. In this ex-
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periment, the structure of the platform remains fixed, but the platform’s identity is
experimentally manipulated. The ratio of proposed internal and external returns is
varied between the treatment and control groups. I measure whether this treatment
influences the propensity of subjects to create an account on the platform. While
the scope of this particular experiment is limited, the potential for randomized ex-
perimentation in crowdfunding contexts is significant.
The setting is a small for-profit Chinese peer-to-peer lending website in mid-
2013. At the time, the industry in China was fairly new and there were many small
startups (Li, 2013). Given this newness, it was unclear whether lenders treated
the service as a pure substitute for other forms of investment or if they would be
responsive to the potential social benefits of the activity. The first chapter of this
dissertation provides additional context on the industry.
Like all crowdfunding platforms, new user registration was an important step
in increasing the amount of funds lent through the platform. Lender registration
involved filling out an online form including name, email address, and phone number,
and creating a user name and password. Registration represented a necessary first
step in making actual loans. After each registration, a company representative would
call the new registrant to provide additional information and answer questions.
Two channels existed for new user registration: a form linked from the home-
page (a “natural” registration) and special registration-only pages designed for in-
coming web traffic from online advertisements. These advertisements were placed
on a range of other websites using Internet advertising networks and were specif-
ically targeted to lenders (conversely, potential borrowers could register through
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other means). When a user clicked on an ad they were directed to a special “land-
ing page” on the company’s website, where they were presented with information
on the platform’s features and benefits and the ability to register as a user. A sub-
set of these landing-page visitors actually successfully completed registration with
the company. The difference between the total number of people that viewed the
page and the number that successfully registered—typically called the “conversion
rate”—represents an important metric that was tracked by the marketing manager
and followed by the CEO. Similar metrics are used in many online services and
strategies to optimize them are widely discussed by practitioners (e.g., Harwood
and Harwood, 2009).
3.2 Treatment design
The experimental treatment takes the form of a manipulation to the landing
page. Two separate web pages were designed for the test. Care was taken to limit
the differences between each of the web pages to only the elements important to
the treatment, while at the same time ensuring that each page looked natural. In
practice, this involved manipulating one line of text. When a user arrived at the
website they were randomly presented with one of the two page designs, and their
subsequent decision of whether to complete the registration process was logged. A
third-party tool was used to assist page design, randomization, and tracking of user
decisions.26
To test this, a single sentence of the standard landing page material was al-
26Visual Website Optimizer: visualwebsiteoptimizer.com
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tered to highlight the social benefit to borrowers. Figure 3.1 shows each version of
page and highlights the differences. In the default “financial” version (Figure 3.1a),
the sentence of interest read: “Use [the platform] to invest your spare funds and
increase your personal wealth.” In the “social” version (Figure 3.1b) it read: “Use
[the platform] to invest your spare funds and help others realize their dreams.” Ev-
erything else on the two pages was identical.27 Because the financial elements were
already highlighted, emphasizing the social element was hypothesized to increase the
total expected utility of using the platform. If users do derive non-financial benefit
in addition to financial, then highlighting the social element of peer-to-peer lending
should increase registration compared to only highlighting the financial element.
If true, this could substantially alter the strategy of a platform. Implications
can range from marketing strategy to the definition of industry competitors. For
example, should focus be placed on the collection and display of borrower personal
information, or can borrowers be anonymized and packaged into investment prod-
ucts? Understanding why funders derive benefit from their activity is therefore an
important question.
3.3 Results
For internal auditing purposes at the company, each ad network already had
its own landing-page URL, and the number of incoming visitors from each ad net-
work fluctuated significantly given the amount of budget allocated to it during any
27It is worth noting that the financial benefit was highlighted on other portions of the page,
therefore the “social” version does not represent the absence of content related to financial benefits.
However, the opposite is true.
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particular time period. Further, the registration rates between networks varied
significantly. The cause of this variance was attributed to the type of consumers
to which different ad networks had access. Experimental data from ad networks
with very low volume or conversion rates of less than one percent are not reported
(randomization occurred at the ad network level, so this does not impact validity).
Because the treatment is temporally and spatially discrete, issues related to
self-selection into and out of the experimental groups are greatly minimized. There-
fore, a simple comparison of means is sufficient to understand the causal effect of
the treatment. The “social” condition was shown to 1,482 visitors and resulted in
341 registrations (23.0%). The “financial” condition was shown to 1,539 visitors and
resulted in 349 registrations (22.7%). The difference in registration rates was there-
fore not significant between the treatment and control (z score of 0.22). Potential
lenders did not appear to respond to the potential social benefits.
The lack of results can be interpreted in a number of ways. The simplest and
most straightforward explanation is that the difference between the treatment and
control stimuli was too marginal to register with subjects. The design of this type
of experiment faces a trade off: if the difference between the treatment and control
version is too great, it can be difficult to isolate the theoretical mechanism that
causes the response. If it is too small, however, it may have no impact. The later
is possible in this case. Second, it is possible that the landing page itself was less
salient to potential lenders than a previous exposure to the company. Participants
may have had prior knowledge of the industry, for example, and all participants
reached the landing page via the advertising networks discussed above. It is possible
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that participants responded strongly to these advertisements and less strongly to
the content of the landing page. If participants already knew how they wanted to
behave before the treatment, then this experiment may have had little opportunity
to impact their behavior.28
It is also possible that lenders simply did not care about non-financial benefits
and other sections of the page were sufficient to convince them of the financial
benefits. This appears consistent with the ex-ante behavior of the firm, which
had not previously highlighted social elements. If there were a significant social
element then one might expect a manager to have already incorporated this into
their promotion of the platform. Finally, it is even possible that lenders who derive
social benefit do so at the exclusion of financial benefits, meaning the extra financial
information canceled out the social benefits.
3.4 Conclusion
I presented a simple experiment conducted on an online peer-to-peer lending
website. Additional social benefits of lending were proposed to prospective lenders in
the treatment condition. There was no difference between the treatment and control
groups in the propensity of participants to register for the platform. This null result
can be interpreted in a number of ways, ranging from issues of treatment design
28The content of the advertisements took the form of brief “banner ads” and focused on the
financial investment aspect of the platform. These ads were not experimentally manipulated, so
all participants would have seen the same content before being assigned to the treatment or control
group. The null result is consistent with a scenario where participants decided their level of interest
based on these ads and not the landing page content. However, if this were the case it is unclear
why a higher conversion rate is not observed for both treatment and control groups, as those that
did not wish to register would not have clicked on the ad and would not have been part of the
sample.
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to more substantial theoretical interpretations. Hopefully this simple example will
lead to more work in this area, as crowdfunding is a phenomena that is particularly
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